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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses original research to achieve two goals. First, it is meant to give
the first analytical account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, along with its political
significance. Second, it proposes a new theory of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.
This thesis proposes that ethnic groups will have an increasing role in American foreign
policy for three reasons. First, they have superior knowledge to elites who are encrusted
in Cold War ways of thinking and divorced from their electorate. Second, Congress is
more active in foreign policy and more permeable to the ethnic lobby. Third, the ethnic
population of the United States is growing. The thesis works on at least five levels. First:
the role of nationalism in world politics, especially in the collapse of the Soviet Union
which now increasingly challenges the system of sovereign states. Second: the way in
which foreign policy is made in Washington, including the roles of the President, his
bureaucracy, Congress and the media. Third: the role of lobbies in the foreign policy
making process. Fourth: electoral politics and its role in decisionmaking. Fifth: East
European ethnics, Ukrainian-Americans in particular, and their role as subjects and objects






A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 2
B. IMPORTANCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 3
C. PURPOSE 6
D. METHODOLOGY 7
E. ORDER OF THESIS 8
II. CAPTIVE NATIONS: THE LIBERATION MYTH 10
A. ETHNOPOLITICS 10
B. THE WAY THE REPUBLICANS GOT THE ETHNIC VOTE --- 11
C. ROLLING BACK THE DEMOCRATS 12
D. MISSED OPPORTUNITY 13
E. THE EVIL EMPIRE 15
III. "CHICKEN KIEV" 17
A. BUSH GETS TOUGH ON COMMUNISM 17
B. "BLOODY SUNDAYS" IN THE BALTICS 18
C. "E" MAIL AND PARALLEL DIPLOMACY 20
D. "FREEDOM IS NOT THE SAME AS INDEPENDENCE" 21
E. "CHICKEN KIEV" AND THE COUP 23
F. CONGRESS EXPLOITS "CHICKEN KIEV" 23
IV
G. THE LOBBY GAINS MOMENTUM 25
H. THE WOFFORD LANDSLIDE: SENDING BUSH A
MESSAGE - 26
I. THE BUREAUCRACY JOINS THE FRAY 27
J. CONGRESS WEIGHS-IN - 29
K. MEETING THE LOBBY, REVERSING COURSE 30
L. "WELCOMING" THE VOTE, GRANTING RECOGNITION -- 32
IV. THE LOBBY: IMMIGRATION AND ELECTORAL
SIGNIFICANCE 34
A. INTRODUCTION 34
B. IMMIGRATION AND POLITICIZATION 35
C. THE THIRD WAVE AND PARTY POLITICS 39
D. SUMMARY 41
V. THREE PHASES OF THE LOBBY 43
A. INTRODUCTION 43
B. PHASE ONE: CAPTIVE NATIONS, FAILURE OR
FOUNDATION? 44
C. PHASE TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HELSINKI
COMMISSION, ASSIMILATION OR RESURGENCE? — 48




A. CAPTIVE NATIONS AND THE HELSINKI COMMISSION:
MERGING INTERESTS 60
B. THE REASONS WHY CONGRESS GOT INVOLVED 62
C. NINE GOOD REASONS WHY THE LOBBY SHOULD
HAVE FAILED 62
D. SIZE OF THE LOBBY AS A REASON FOR FAILURE 67
E. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION - — 71
VII . CONCLUSIONS 78
APPENDIX A: CLINTON CAMPAIGN LEAFLET 80
APPENDIX B: 1980 AND 1990 CENSUS DATA ON UKRAINIAN-
AMERICANS 82
APPENDIX C: PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARKS TO THE SUPREME
SOVIET OF THE UKRAINE IN KIEV, SOVIET
UNION 84
APPENDIX D: U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION 89
APPENDIX E: U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION 91
APPENDIX F: SPONSORS AND CO-SPONSORS OF HOUSE AND
SENATE RESOLUTIONS ON UKRAINIAN
INDEPENDENCE 93
APPENDIX G: CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION 95
APPENDIX H: CAPTIVE NATIONS LIST 98
LIST OF REFERENCES 100
BIBLIOGRAPHY 105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 109
VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
Title: FROM "CHICKEN KIEV" TO UKRAINIAN RECOGNITION:
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Author: Susan D. Fink
Classification: Unclassified
Student Graduation Date: June 1993
Student Curriculum: Eastern Europe/Central Eurasia
This Executive Summary it provided to Curricula Sponsors (N3/5 and N2) only. It is intended to act as advance notification of areas of
topical interest to Curricula Sponsors. Advance copies of the entire thesis are available on floppy diskette to sponsors only. NAVPGSCOL
POC is Dr. Thomas Bruneau (DSN 878-2521) or LCDR Steve Thayer PSN 878-2228).
vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From "Chicken Kiev" to Ukrainian Recognition:
Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy
LT Susan D. Fink, USN
June 1993
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it is meant to give the first analytical
account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, along with its political significance. Second, it
is meant to point out that political science theories of the role of ethnicity in foreign policy
did not predict what happened in the case of U.S. recognition of Ukrainian independence.
This thesis proposes a new theory of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.
Just four months after President Bush announced in Kyiv that the United States
would not recognize Ukrainian independence, he reversed his stand. The reason for his
reversal was domestic politics.
From Woodrow Wilson, American Presidents pursued a dualistic approach to the
"captive nations." Domestically, they reaffirmed the American commitment to liberating
nations under Soviet control, but in Moscow they reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Soviet's
free hand in those republics. As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, President Bush
sought to hold it together. He continued the trend of his predecessors, but the
international context had changed. The dualism alienated the Ukrainian-Americans as well
as other East European ethnic groups. These groups, which were securely in the pocket
of the Republican Party since the Second World War, mobilized against Bush. Their
efforts, including a Congressional resolution urging the President to reverse his position,
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a punishing vote against the Republicans in the 1991 Pennsylvania senatorial race and the
lobbying of White House officials, put tremendous pressure on the President at the
beginning of a crucial election year. The pressure was enough to cause Bush to reverse
his stand. The United States recognized Ukraine on December 25, 1991.
The case of Ukrainian independence may indicate a shift in the U.S. domestic
political process toward an increasing role for ethnic groups in the post-Cold War environ-
ment. While the role of the ethnic lobby has been discounted in the past, they may play
an increasing role in the future. This is because, in addition to traditional lobbying
techniques, the lobby's most powerful tool was their message. The ethnic lobby
understood the geopolitical and strategic importance of an independent Ukraine, as well
as the ethnonational powderkeg on which Moscow sat throughout the Cold War. The
ethnic community's insight and information exceeded that of high level government
officials, the intelligence community and Sovietologists. The collapse of the Soviet Union,
demise of the multi-ethnic state and the rise of nations creates an increasing need in
American security for the insight which the ethnic community provided in 1991.
The thesis encompasses at least five levels or themes. First: the role of national-
ism in world politics, especially in the collapse of the Soviet Union which now
increasingly challenges the system of sovereign states. Second: the way in which foreign
policy is made in Washington, including the roles of the President, his bureaucracy,
Congress and the media. Third: the role of lobbies in the foreign policymaking process.
Fourth: electoral politics and its role in decisionmaking. Fifth: East European ethnics,
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Ukrainian-Americans in particular, and their role as subjects and objects in the struggle
between Democrats and Republicans for the ethnic vote.
Because this is the first account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the author relied
primarily upon personal interviews. The analytical account of recognition is given in
Chapters II and III. Ukrainian-American immigration patterns which gave them the
perceived power necessary to sway the President are addressed in Chapter IV. The
lobby's Congressional ties were especially helpful in the recognition process. The
development of these ties is addressed in the account of the lobby's evolution in Chapter
V. The combination of parochial and policy motivations which caused members of
Congress to support the recognition legislation will be explored in Chapter VI.
I. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most important events of the
twentieth century. The linchpin of the empire was Ukraine. If that nation of 52 million
achieved independence, the Soviet Union would crumble. President Bush, urged on by
his friend Mikhail Gorbachev, did all he could to keep Ukraine in the union. On August
1, 1991 he announced in Kyiv 1 that Americans would not support Ukrainian indepen-
dence, and admonished Ukrainians to sign Gorbachev's Union Treaty. Bush called their
democratic aspirations "suicidal nationalism," a phrase provided him by Gorbachev
himself, and exhorted them to remember that "freedom is not the same as independence."
[Refs. 1,2] Like all postwar presidents, Bush reaffirmed the Soviets' free hand in the
non-Russian republics, and supported Gorbachev and his allies in the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in their attempt to hold the Soviet Union together. Just four
months later, Bush reversed his course. He did so because five decades of dualistic anti-
communist rhetoric finally caught up with the White House. They had become so
accustomed to their own double talk that, when the Soviet system collapsed out from
under them, they could not adjust to the reality of emerging nations. Instead, they clung
desperately to the old order. Gorbachev's inability to adapt cost him his union and his
presidency. George Bush's inflexibility cost him the East European ethnic vote in a
'"Kyiv" has been adopted by the Ukrainian Embassy, Washington, D.C. as part of
the process of converting Ukrainian names from Russian translations, such as "Kiev," into
Ukrainian translations.
1
crucial election year. In the end, the President was forced to recognize an independent
Ukraine, but it occurred in an embarrassing way which left the new state and people with
no political debts to the U.S. Government.
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
What Bush did not take into account in his Kyiv address was that, by 1991, the
rules of the policy game had changed, both in the Soviet Union and in American domestic
politics. American East European ethnic groups, including the Ukrainian-Americans, had
been safely in the GOP's pocket from World War II. In 1991, they became one of the
Republican's electoral foes. Exploiting the Democratic need for election-year leverage,
they adeptly lobbied members of Congress and the bureaucracy to bring down the Bush
stand against Ukraine. A small community with none of the force of the Jewish lobby,
the Ukrainians relied upon organization, communication, access to decisionmakers and
the power of election-year politics. The lobby's most powerful tool, however, was its
message: an independent Ukraine, and not Gorbachev's communism, was vital to
American national security. Their success was tremendous. Largely due to their
lobbying, the Senate passed a resolution urging Bush to recognize Ukraine, the Secretary
of Defense officially parted ways with the State Department-sponsored Bush policy while
the Democratic party scored multiple touchdowns with Bush's August speech, dubbed
"Chicken Kiev" by the American media (Appendix A). All this was too much for the
Bush policy to bear. Fewer than four months after the President set the course of
American foreign policy in Kyiv, he reversed it. On November 27th, four days before
Ukrainians voted in a referendum on independence, Bush met a group of 15
Ukrainian-Americans in the White House West Wing. To this delegation, which repre-
sented an organized community of some 100,000 Americans, the President announced that
Ukraine was "entitled to independence." 2 He granted formal recognition on December
25th.
B. IMPORTANCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
The Ukrainian-American case may shed new light on ethnic politics. This is
because most studies have concluded that a lobby's influence is dependent upon such
strategies as coalition-building, access to power and grass-roots mobilization. [Ref. 3:p.
116; 4:p. 464] In addition to their electoral role in U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the
ethnic lobby played an important informational role.
U.S. Cold War Soviet policy was made by the President and a few of his closest
advisors. [Refs. 5,6,7] George Kennan, the father of American containment strategy,
typifies these foreign policy elites. 3 That any lobby could influence these wisemen was
considered unlikely if not unthinkable. That such a small lobby (740,000 by census
statistics, only some 100,000 in an organized community) was able to effect a complete
reversal of policy seemed even more ridiculous.
2By 1990 census statistics there are 740,803 Ukrainian-Americans. By indications of
membership in Ukrainian-American organizations, 100,000 are members. See Appendix
B.
3In Kennan's Around the Craved Hill, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), he
recommends the U.S. form a non-political foreign policy council of elders. However, a
more open politics may be better, especially when the experts are wrong.
However, the ethnics understood what the CIA, State Department and huge
community of Soviet experts did not: that the Soviet nationalities question was the
greatest ethnonational dilemma of the 20th century, and that Ukraine was the thread
which, if tugged by American recognition, would unravel the entire communist empire. 4
That citizens at the lowest levels of the American socioeconomic ladder understood what
powerful officials at the highest levels of government did not is one of the most striking
paradoxes of American policy toward Moscow. 5
Ukraine's geopolitical importance was also shrugged-off by the Bush policy.
Ukraine is the one country which prevents the reconstitution of the empire. Belarus,
which borders Russia and Poland, has rejoined the Russian military structure. As a
sovereign state, Ukraine physically and politically separates Russia from Europe.
Between states once dominated by the Red Threat-Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and
Romania-now stands a free country: continental Europe's second largest state, its second
largest army and the inheritor of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Furthermore,
half of the population of the Soviet Union lived outside of Russia. About half of those
live in Ukraine. U.S. policy which focuses on Russia ignores half of the situation.
4For more information on Ukraine see Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1988) and John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd
edition, (Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990).
5Only a marginal group of Soviet specialists held that the multicultural nature of the
USSR was important. For arguments that ethnopolitics was the key weakness of the
USSR before the collapse, see works of Walker Connor, Robert Conquest, Teresa
Rakowska-Harmstone, Roman Szporluk and Hugh Seton-Watson. Since the collapse,
numerous works have appeared on this topic.
Perhaps most significant of all, Ukrainian-Americans realized before the Bush White
House, that international events had overtaken American foreign policymaking structure
and content. The dualistic tactics of Republican policy-domestic talk about liberating the
"captive nations" with simultaneous assurances in Moscow of non-interference-could not
work after 1989. 6 The administration could no longer use human rights and democratic
self-determination rhetoric by labeling them tools of containment. International events
forced Bush to make the choice which no president since Wilson had been forced to
make. By backing Gorbachev, Bush chose the world he knew throughout his long
postwar career, even though this meant supporting Gorbachev and the USSR against its
people. Thus, it was the ethnics-with their insight into the Soviet ethno- national
powderkeg-and not professional diplomats nor "Sovietologists," who understood the
realistic policy. They exposed Bush's clinging to the old world as hopeless and doomed
to failure.
The case of Ukrainian independence may indicate a shift in the U.S. domestic
political process toward an increasing role for ethnic groups in the post-Cold War
environment. 7 As the raging war in Bosnia demonstrates, the United States must
^he contradictory policies of liberation and containment, from the Truman to Bush
administrations, are examined in Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls And Bridges, (New York: New
York University, 1991).
7For a look at the reasons why the ethnic lobby was considered ineffective in the past
see Bernard Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1973), Irving Louis Horowitz, "Ethnic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy," in
Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, Abdul Aziz Said, ed., (New York: Praeger, 1977),
and Stephen A. Garrett, From Potsdam to Poland: American Policy Toward Eastern
Europe, (New York: Praeger, 1986).
reconcile foreign policy to the fall of the large, multi-ethnic state and the rise of nations.
As the former Yugoslavia also shows, procrastination in facing complex ethnic conflicts
abroad can present rapidly deteriorating policy options. It is time for policymakers to
throw away outdated Cold War thinking and "Sovietology." As the ethnic lobby argued
in 1991, a realistic American foreign policy must be founded upon an understanding of
the historical and cultural context, and not be limited to personal contacts with a few
diplomats, high officials and academics in government structures as was the case with the
White House and Gorbachev's Moscow.
C. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it is meant to give an analytical account
of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, along with its political significance. This has not been
done before. Second, it is meant to point out that political science theories of the role of
ethnicity in foreign policy did not predict what happened in the case of U.S. recognition
of Ukrainian independence. This may indicate a new trend in the American political
process, including a new theory of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.
The thesis encompasses at least five levels or themes, of which the reader should
be aware. First: the role of nationalism in world politics, especially in the collapse of
the Soviet Union which now increasingly challenges the system of sovereign states.
Second: the way in which foreign policy is made in Washington, including the roles of
the President, his bureaucracy, Congress and the media. Third: the role of lobbies in
the foreign policymaking process. Fourth: electoral politics and its role in decisionmak-
ing. Fifth: East European ethnics, Ukrainian-Americans in particular, and their role as
subjects and objects in the struggle between Democrats and Republicans for the ethnic
vote.
D. METHODOLOGY
Because this is the first account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the author relied
primarily upon personal interviews. Interviews were conducted in person and by
telephone. Some of those interviewed asked not to be identified by name and have been
identified instead by their occupation and position (in keeping with their anonymity). A
common bank of questions was used for all interviewees whether or not the subject
supported or opposed the lobby, in order to determine relative familiarity with the
subject. Additional questions were added depending upon degree of familiarity and time
available.
Quantitative analysis of ethnic voting behavior and Congressional support for the
lobby was found to be lacking, and qualitative analysis by interviewees supplemented the
numerical data available. The reasons for the lack of data seem to result from relatively
little work which has been done recently on the role of ethnicity in foreign policy.
One important purpose of this thesis is to show that the perceived power of the
lobby can be much greater than its actual electoral strength. One reason critics argued
against the lobby's impact was their small size and minimal electoral significance. But
policymakers' perceptions were different. President Bush agreed to meet with Ukrainian-
Americans in the White House-apparently to minimize electoral damage done by
"Chicken Kiev "--without any substantive data on the broader community's size or voting
habits. The Wofford landslide in the Pennsylvania senatorial contest of November 1991
was perceived by Democrats and Republicans as an East European ethnic protest vote
which punished Bush's abandonment of Baltic countries and for "Chicken Kiev." [Ref.
8: p. 448] The Ukrainian-Americans were few in number, but they formed part of an
Eastern European ethnic group living in key eastern and midwest states (Appendices D,
E).
E. ORDER OF THESIS
That such a small ethnic community was able to reverse U.S. foreign policy is
remarkable. As mentioned above, the lobby's perceived power was linked to demograph-
ics and strategic location. One study concluded that 203 of the 270 electoral votes needed
to elect a president are located in the states where East European ethnic groups are ten
percent of the vote or greater. [Ref. 9:p. 10] Therefore, the Ukrainian-American
immigration patterns and political character will be addressed in Chapter IV.
A group may be perceived as having electoral power, but it must be able to
manipulate the strings of Washington to exploit its electoral potential. The Ukrainian-
Americans were able to reach key decisionmakers with their message. During the Cold
War, and especially during detente, their goal seemed futile. Yet, through three postwar
phases, the lobby adapted to international and domestic political climates, and was able
to keep Ukrainian independence on the political agenda. The ties made in Congress,
especially those made after the lobby's shift to a human rights focus in the 1980's, proved
essential in the recognition process. This is the subject of Chapter V.
While many Democrats in Congress were eager to beat George Bush over the head
with "Chicken Kiev" because of election-year politics, genuine policy disagreements
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motivated others to do the same. Members of Congress who worked on Soviet human
rights cases in the 1970's and 1980's were familiar with Moscow's harsh policies toward
Ukrainian patriots, and the historical animosity between Russia and Ukraine. Several of
the prisoners whom these congressmen worked to free became leaders of the democratic
opposition parties. With these personal ties, members of Congress, like the ethnic
community which lobbied them, were better informed about the circumstances inside the
Soviet Union in 1991 than were the Moscow-based administration sources. Their
convictions also served their politics. The Republican weakness offered a possibility of
breaking the Republican hold on the white ethnic vote for the crucial election of 1992.
Since George Bush was relying heavily on his foreign policy successes for reelection,
these members were eager to pull that rug out from under him. The combination of
parochial and policy motivations which rallied members of Congress around the banner
of Ukrainian independence will be explored in Chapter VI.
II. CAPTIVE NATIONS: THE LIBERATION MYTH
Every election year since the second World War, East European ethnic Americans
drew voting booth curtains behind them and renewed their faith in the Republican party.
From 1948, the GOP vowed to liberate their captive homelands. In 1991, these ethnics
cashed-in their chips of party allegiance only to fmd that the Republican promise of
liberation for their homelands was bankrupt.
A. ETHNOPOLITICS
How could George Bush declare on July 12, 1991:
[U]ntil freedom and independence have been achieved for every captive
nation, we shall continue to call on all governments and states to uphold both
the letter and the spirit of international human rights agreements. [Ref. 10]
And fewer than two weeks later tell the deputies in Kyiv:
Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support
those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local
despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based
upon ethnic hatred. [Appendix C]
The speeches show how a president can speak about liberation at home and
domination abroad. This is nothing new. Woodrow Wilson began the trend with self-
determination rhetoric designed to curry the ethnic vote, but leaving out inhabitants of
lands in the empires of his allies. Presidents, Democrats as well as Republicans, used
two languages: with elites in Moscow they would speak frankly and realistically,
assuring them of U.S. non-interference in Eastern Europe. With the masses, presidents
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used a different language, filled with symbolism designed to threaten or reassure them in
order to get their votes. [Ref. 11]
Henry Kissinger provides another good example of this dual-track, which sometimes
perilously verged on contempt for the American electorate. In a recently uncovered
Communist Party document, Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin recounted the
words of President Nixon's NSC advisor to him on June 12, 1969:
President Nixon takes into account the Soviet Union's special interests in East
Europe and does not intend to do anything there that would be assessed in
Moscow as a "challenge" to its position in this region. That is Nixon's basic
approach to this question and there is no need, affirmed Kissinger, to pay
great attention "to separate public critical statements by the president on one
East European country or another, since this is only tribute to some layers of
the U.S. population which play a role in American elections." [Ref. 12]
B. THE WAY THE REPUBLICANS GOT THE ETHNIC VOTE
Since Woodrow Wilson introduced the idea of national self-determination into U.S.
policies in an effort to corner the massive bloc of Central and East European ethnic voters
during the First World War, the Republicans and Democrats have engaged in a tug-of-war
for the ethnic vote. Wilson raised ethnic hopes for liberation of their homelands with the
organization of Oppressed Nationalities of Central Europe, formed in 1918 by George
Creel. [Ref. 13:p. 89] Because the nations to enjoy liberation were those under Austria-
Hungary and Germany, this turned Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, German and
Irish ethnics against the Democrats. Subsequently, the largely blue-collar ethnics were
drawn to the Democrat's New Deal under Roosevelt. 8
8
Little is known about the number of ethnics under the Democratic and Republican
tents in this period, and it bears investigation.
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After World War II, however, the Republicans won the ethnic vote. Three things
seem to have caused the shift of allegiance. First, postwar immigrants, or Displaced
Persons, were highly politicized, nationally-conscious refugees unmoved by Democratic
economic policies. Second, the ethnics believed Roosevelt had sold their homelands down
the river at Yalta. Third, Eisenhower learned from Wilson's success and used it in his
"liberation plank" in the 1952 campaign, his policy of "rollback" (whereby Americans
would roll back the Soviets from Eastern Europe) and his sponsoring of the Captive
Nations resolution in 1959 (which declared that the independence of those nations was
vital to American interests.)9
Since Eisenhower's administration, the Republican's stanch anti-communist platform
and rhetoric was sufficient to keep the East Europeans in the GOP. There they stayed
until history caught up with the Republicans in 1992.
C. ROLLING BACK THE DEMOCRATS
[T]he [Republican] policy of liberation seems to have been devised primarily
to roll back the Democrats in the United States, not the Red Army in Eastern
Europe. And for this domestic purpose, liberation was a highly effective
strategy. [Ref. 14:p. 73]
Liberation theory was politics. For the Republicans this included "roll back" and
Captive Nations Week. [Ref. 15]
The Captive Nations Week resolution was signed by President Eisenhower and
passed as Public Law 86-90 by Congress in 1959 (Appendices G, H). The resolution and
9For a study of the third wave of immigrants see W. Isajiw, Y. Boshyk, R. Senkus,
eds., The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons After World War II.
(Edmonton: Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).
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the ethnic lobby's role in framing it and preserving it will be discussed in another chapter
For the present discussion, it should be noted that the resolution declared that liberation
of Ukraine was a vital national interest:
[I]t is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for
liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations
should be steadfastly kept alive; and
Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming
majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful
deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and
Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an
appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United
States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and
independence. [Ref. 16:p. 100]
Some argue that Republicans adopted the resolution hastily-verbatim from the draft
provided by Georgetown professor and leader of the Ukrainian lobby, Lev Dobriansky--in
anticipation of ethnic opposition to Eisenhower's meeting with Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev three weeks later. [Ref. 15:p. 183] They argue that the Congress which
passed it unanimously considered it a "routine respon.se" to constituent wishes, and was
ignorant of its content. [Ref. 17:p. 984]
D. MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Ironically, the United States held the key to the Soviet unravelling all along and,
because of a fixation on containment, never chose to use it. In 1960, the author of the
Captive Nations Week resolution wrote: "Russia understands the significance of the force
of nationalism far better than we do." [Ref. 16:p. 11] Khrushchev's vehement protests
against the resolution, and Soviet attempts to overshadow its yearly observance, should
13
have alerted American leaders to the potential power of Captive Nations. 10 Confronting
Vice President Nixon in July 1959, Khrushchev shouted, "This resolution stinks!"
According to Nixon, "he spelled out what he meant in earthy four letter words." [Ref.
18] In a Foreign Affairs article Khrushchev confessed, "I would not be telling the full
truth if I did not say that the adoption of this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the
Soviet people as an act of provocation." [Ref. 18]
Instead of exploiting the Soviet reaction to Captive Nations, Presidents ritually
assured Moscow of its insignificance. The American government's official position was
established ten years before Captive Nations became law, in NSC 58/2. The policy study
argued that the American goal "must be the elimination of Soviet control" of these
nations, but that resorting to war to achieve liberation "should be rejected as a practical
alternative." [Ref. 9:p. 181] American inaction in response to the Hungarian uprising
of 1956, to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to martial law in Poland
in 1981 reaffirmed the U.S. position.
As American policy shifted to "detente," the gap between foreign and domestic
rhetoric widened. The Nixon administration provides a striking example, as Henry
Kissinger increasingly began to flirt with Metternichean projects of a stable world which
included a Sonnenfeldt Doctrine of a closer, "organic" relationship of the USSR with
Eastern Europe.
Gerald Ford realized the need to satisfy ethnic voters too late. In a debate with
Jimmy Carter before the 1976 election, he said that the United States recognized Soviet
10This will be examined further in a chapter on the three phases of the lobby.
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domination of Poland. Foreshadowing President Bush's White House meeting with the
Ukrainian-Americans, President Ford received Polish-American leaders in an attempt to
minimize the political damage. He lost the ethnic vote and the election.
E. THE EVIL EMPIRE
In the aftermath of the 1981 Polish "crackdown, "...whoever occupied the
White House would have... [to have] declared that the United States will
"never accept" a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. [Ref. 19: p. 223]
Of all the postwar presidents, Ronald Reagan wielded Captive Nations most deftly.
Reagan elevated the week to unprecedented heights. Crafting human rights and
democratic self-determination into his "Evil Empire" strategy, Reagan was the first
president to make the annual observance a public event and used it to showcase or
announce policy. For example, he used his 1988 address to support anti-communist
Afghan freedom fighters. He included a letter received from Soviet dissidents:
"Mr. President," they wrote, "We can hardly envisage the struggle for human
rights without a struggle for the national rights of nations. And as today, so
in the future, the freedom of nations is one of the main guarantees for human
rights." [Ref. 20]
To the ethnic community, it seemed as though an American president finally grasped
the potential power of the Captive Nations concept. The same was true in Ukraine. In
1990, when the independence movement began to gain momentum, an American visitor
asked Ukrainians, "why now?" The reply, whether from "parliamentarian or peasant,"
was almost unanimous. The first reason given was Chornobyl, and the need to regain
control of Ukraine from Moscow. The second reason was "Ronald Reagan." [Ref. 21]
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Hopes soared in the U.S. as well, where Reagan elevated Ukrainian-Americans to
prestigious positions. He appointed the author of the Captive Nations resolution, Lev
Dobriansky, as Ambassador to Bermuda, and recognized him and other prominent
members of the community at the yearly Captive Nations events.
After eight years of tough Reagan anti-communism, the East European ethnic
support for the Republican Party was 85 percent. After four years of George Bush, it fell
to 55 percent. [Ref. 22]
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III. "CHICKEN KIEV"
As Moscow lost Eastern Europe and Ukraine, George Bush and the Republican
Party lost their hammerlock on the East European ethnics in America. This is how it
happened.
A. BUSH GETS TOUGH ON COMMUNISM
The 45-year Republican grip on the East European ethnic vote was finally broken
in 1991 . Since the Second World War, the Republican Party relied upon anti-communism
to keep it. Finally, "Chicken Kiev" demonstrated to these voters that George Bush was
more committed to keeping the old bi-polar world order than he was to anti-communism.
Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott tell the story of a limousine ride which
Gorbachev and Bush shared on December 10, 1987. Echoing Kissinger to Dobrynin in
1968, Bush told Gorbachev that no matter how hard a line he had to take against
communism to get elected president in 1988, the Soviet president should "ignore them."
[Ref. 8:p. 4] The Vice President demonstrated that the private operational language he
used with Gorbachev was diametrically different from the image-laden messages he
reserved for American voters.
Throughout his presidency, Bush's relationship with Gorbachev grew more
important in his decisionmaking. The relationship helped him win Soviet backing in the
Gulf War, which proved essential. Without Gorbachev and a strong, stable center in
Moscow, Bush believed he could not count on that help in the future. His approach was
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consistent. He always backed states rather than peoples, however communist or
repressive they might be. For example, he backed the Chinese communist leaders against
the Tibetans in 1977 [Ref. 23:pp. 64-65], and then he backed them again against their
own people after the Tianenmen Square massacre in 1989. When Gorbachev authorized
bloody crackdowns in the Baltics, Bush found it more important to support the Soviet
leader than to condemn his policies and jeopardize the relationship. These cases indicate
that, even though Bush took a tough domestic stand against communism, his concern for
the old system, in which he was comfortable working, prevailed in the end. He
consistently favored states over peoples, but this left him dangerously out of touch in a
time of rapid historic change, and made him reactionary. He was not a human rights
president but neither was he a political realist.
B. "BLOODY SUNDAYS" IN THE BALTICS
Washington has two kinds of Soviet visitors these days--which is only fair
since the Bush administration seems to have two Soviet policies. The
schizophrenia is a sign of progress.
One sort of visitor is Eduard Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister,
who urges solidarity with Mikhail Gorbachev and more credit for the
Kremlin. He gets most of the media attention. The other sort is Vytautas
Landsbergis, the president of Lithuania, who represents the striving
republicans who will inherit the disintegrating Soviet empire. He's mostly ig-
nored. [Ref. 24]
On January 2, 1991, Soviet troops seized buildings in Vilnius. On the 13th, the
troops killed 15 Lithuanians there. One week later, Soviet troops killed four Latvians in
Riga. Bush's reaction to the "Bloody Sundays" was restrained. Although Vilnius and
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Riga were not Hungary in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Poland in 1981, Bush's responses
were similar to his predecessors' after those crackdowns.
Bush did not enjoy the political latitude of his predecessors. Whereas Cold War
containment policy as outlined in NSC 58/2 rejected liberation because it required force,
liberation in 1991 required only diplomatic recognition. In the nascent "post-Cold War,"
ethnic voters could turn to the Democrats, recently liberated from the fear of being called
"soft on communism." Had Bush understood this, his speech in Kyiv might have been
very different.
Gorbachev implored Bush not to go to Kyiv in August, 1991, explaining that the
trip would give ground to the Ukrainian "nationalists." Bush decided to make the trip,
but he showed the speech he was to make there to Gorbachev while in Moscow. [Ref.
8:p. 417] The speech's attacks on "suicidal nationalism," which so infuriated Ukrainians
and Americans, were not in the original speech Bush brought from Washington. Rather,
they were inserted after consulting with Gorbachev. On Air Force One, during the flight
from Moscow to Kiev, the President told reporters that:
...he had discussed the visit with Gorbachev to see if he had any concerns.
He said the Soviet president did not and added "There's confidence in
Moscow that the Ukraine will come along on the union treaty.... No, there is
no heartburn at all that I can detect about going here. And I think we'll
handle it with proper balance." [Ref. 25:p. Al]
The proper balance included making it clear to the deputies that the United States
intended to back Moscow, while not fueling sentiment for independence in Ukraine or
alienating voters in the U.S.
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The speech in Kyiv had the opposite effect Bush desired. The picture of "suicidal
nationalists" which Gorbachev had painted for Bush was not the reality. When Bush
walked to the podium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, his audience knew much more
about him that he knew about them.
C. "E" MAIL AND PARALLEL DIPLOMACY
Before George Bush stepped off his plane in Kyiv in August 1991, the Ukrainians
already knew what he was going to say. The day before the "Chicken Kiev" speech, Ivan
Drach, one of the leaders of the democratic party Rukh, rebutted the speech, criticizing
Bush's Moscow-focus and misunderstanding of the Soviet reality:
President Bush was once the head of the CIA. He must have learned a great
deal about the center's ravages of Ukraine, its disregard for human life and
spirit... [but] we must be realistic. As President, George Bush seems to have
been hypnotized by Gorbachev... I am afraid that Bush has come here as a
messenger for the center... the President's spokesman said that the President
had never been to Kiev [sic]...and wanted to see some Soviet culture....We
are not a sample of soviet culture. . . .Our culture is the culture of Ukraine, the
culture of Ukrainians, Russians who live in Ukraine, Jews, Poles. Ukraine
will become independent despite the center. Like the United States that cast
off the British Empire, Ukraine will cast off Moscow's Soviet Empire. [Ref.
26]
How did Drach know what Bush would say? Very simply: glasnost and electronic
mail. Even as Bush and Baker negotiated with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Ukrainian-
Americans communicated with their opposition through "E-mail" several times each day.
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Frustrated with pursuing traditional channels of lobbying, Ukrainian-Americans developed
a parallel diplomacy with Rukh members in an effort to level the playing field."
Thus, the deputies, informed by contacts in Washington, were well aware of
circumstances in Washington and Moscow which shaped the speech Bush was about to
deliver. Bush, relying upon Gorbachev and Moscow-based State sources to shape his
perception, took the podium without understanding the effect his speech would have.
D. FREEDOM IS NOT THE SAME AS INDEPENDENCE"
Using Gorbachev's message of "suicidal nationalism" in Kyiv demonstrated Bush's
reliance upon Gorbachev. This Moscow-focus gave him two misconceptions. First, Bush
completely misunderstood Soviet nationalities. Equating the Soviet Union with American
federalism, he declared that:
[Fjreedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those
who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local
despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based
upon ethnic hatred. [Ref. 27]
Second, Bush believed Gorbachev could do what he said he could do: create a
liberal empire. That is, he believed that communism could be gradually reformed, to
embrace both democracy in the republics and a strong center which controlled it. Vilnius
and Riga demonstrated, however, that with reform come raised popular expectations,
nThe lobby was not unique. Using this huge, uncontrolled computer billboard-which
was created by the military during the Cold War, Iranians, Iraqi's and Americans
communicated with each other during the Gulf War. Not only does this revolutionary
technology level the diplomatic playing field, but tips the scales of real time information
to the its users. Henceforth, the Nixon-Kissinger-style of foreign policymaking,
exclusively "at the highest levels," may be altered if not made impossible.
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revolution, and the need for harsh crackdowns to reinstate control. "Bloody Sundays"
were not aberrations of perestroika, they were part of it. Nor did Gorbachev indicate
that he would abandon communism for reform. He told Time magazine in June 1990: "I
am now, just as I've always been, a convinced Communist." [Ref. 28] He defined
democracy as "enthusiastic discipline," and told the Ukraine Communist Party Central
Committee plenum in the fall of 1990:
...the party has been, and remains, the main organizing and coordinating
force capable of leading the people along the path of profound socialist renew-
al... Perestroika will not work without the party and its fundamental influence
on all aspects of social life....We say perestroika is the renewal of socialism
but not its dismantling. We say perestroika is revolutionary transformation,
the elimination of the deformations of socialism, but not the restoration of
capitalism. We say perestroika is the revival of creative Marxism, a new
awareness of Leninist ideas.... [Ref. 28]
Gorbachev's staunch defense of communism, and the lengths to which he was
obviously willing to go to preserve it, should have made it clear that democracy and
communism could not coexist in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Baltics made it clear
that democracy could not exist in the republics without independence.
Nonetheless, Bush contended in Kyiv that the United States did not have to make
a choice between communism and democracy:
Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting
President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout
the U.S.S.R. I consider this a false choice....We will maintain the strongest
possible relationship with the Soviet Government of President Gorbachev.
But we also appreciate the new realities of life in the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 27]
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E. "CHICKEN KIEV" AND THE COUP
The speech, while intended to keep Ukrainians in the union and settle the American
domestic debate on recognition had the opposite effect. This is because Bush was playing
by the rules his postwar predecessors had made, without realizing that the game had been
changed. The reality of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship into which Bush introduced his
ideas was completely different from the reality which existed in fact. One observer main-
tains that the speech actually helped precipitate the August coup:
[H]is words unintentionally stiffened the resolve of many non-Russians to
press for independence lest the West continue to back Moscow against their
aspirations. And Mr. Bush unwittingly gave the green light to the coup
plotters~who moved less than three weeks later-by suggesting that the United
States would support virtually any steps to guarantee the territorial integrity
and stability of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 29]
Another observer agreed, contending that Bush's harsh words in Kyiv led the coup
plotters to believe the President would support anyone in Moscow. They underestimated
his attachment to the person of Gorbachev. [Ref. 30] Nonetheless, the day after the
coup, in Kennebunkport, the President's reaction to the coup was restrained. He told
reporters that he believed Soviet Vice President Yanaev, one of the coup plotters, may
be a reformer, too. [Ref. 1]
F. CONGRESS EXPLOITS "CHICKEN KIEV"
In addition to disillusionment in Kyiv and a coup in Moscow, "Chicken Kiev"
sparked immediate reaction in Washington. Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)
condemned the speech on the Senate floor the next day, saying:
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The President's veiled attempts to equate the relationship between the center
and republics with American Federalism ignores both the brutal history and
the involuntary nature of this union. [Ref. 31]
The speech had exposed the Republican's foreign policy flank just as the official
election-year battle was about to begin. It gave Democrats an opportunity they could not
pass up. Both houses drafted resolutions urging President Bush to recognize Ukraine and
establish diplomatic relations. Ironically, the move was not strictly partisan, since
members familiar with the Soviet system (and wanting to see it destroyed) came from both
anti-communist (predominantly Republican) and human rights (predominantly Democratic)
camps. This aspect will be addressed in more depth in a following chapter on Congressio-
nal motivation.
Senators DeConcini and D'Amato (R-NY) sponsored the Senate resolution
(Sen.Con.Res.65), while Representatives Ritter (R-PA) and Hertel (D-MI) sponsored
the House resolution (H.Con. Res. 212). In their "dear colleague" letters, the congress-
men called fellow members to arms:
Now is the time to show Congressional support for the efforts of the people
of Ukraine in their struggle to take their place among the family of free and
democratic nations. [Ref. 32]
First, they addressed human rights and Ukraine's anti-nuclear stance:
Since its declaration [of independence on August 24, 1991], the Ukrainian
parliament has released political prisoners and has pledged to abide by the
Helsinki Final Act and other agreements of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. It has also asserted that it wants to rid itself of all
nuclear weapons on Ukraine's soil. [Ref. 32]
Second, the legislators cited Ukraine's history and cultural autonomy from Russia as a
reason for their right to sovereignty:
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Ukraine, a nation of 52 million people with its own distinct linguistic, cultural
and religious traditions, has experienced tremendous hardships and repression
during seven decades of Soviet rule. [Ref. 32]
Third, they asserted that it was an American security interest to promote democratic
governments, not support communist ones:
By supporting Ukraine's democratically elected government, we can act to
encourage the further development of democracy and a free market economy.
[Ref. 32]
To garner co-sponsorship for the resolutions, the Ukrainian-American lobby mobilized
their community and began their most aggressive lobbying effort ever (Appendix F).
G. THE LOBBY GAINS MOMENTUM
Like the Democrats, Ukrainian-Americans were eager to exploit "Chicken Kiev" to
gain diplomatic recognition. Throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's, most of the
"dear colleague" letters urging support for Ukrainian issues were generated at the Helsinki
Commission, with which the community was working on human rights issues. 12 By the
time Ukrainian independence became a possibility, the Ukrainian-American lobby's
relationship with these members of Congress was already well-exercised.
For example, in 1990 and 1991, thousands of Ukrainian-Americans wrote,
telephoned and visited their representatives seeking the release of Stepan Khmara.
Khmara was a Ukrainian deputy imprisoned for defending a woman who protested for
12The Helsinki Commission was established by Congress in 1976 as an independent
government agency charged with monitoring U.S. compliance with the 1975 Helsinki
Final Act. Its goal was to maintain a linkage between human rights and foreign policy.
Technically independent, 18 of its 21 members were U.S. senators and congressmen. The
Commission dealt with immigration issues in the 1970's and 1980's, working primarily
in Ukraine, the Baltics and other areas with Soviet Jewry.
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independence in Kyiv. The lobby's success was unmatched even by the pro-Israel lobby:
165 members of Congress sent letters to President Gorbachev demanding Khmara's
release. [Ref. 33] Thus, the larger community was mobilized and ready for action.
In addition to lobbying Congress, ethnics were urged to protest with their votes.
An earlier generation had rallied to the Republican Party because the Democrats had sold-
out Eastern Europe at Yalta. In 1991, the message was reversed. Republican's were
portrayed as selling out the Baltics and Ukraine: it was time to send the White House a
signal of protest.
H. THE WOFFORD LANDSLIDE: SENDING BUSH A MESSAGE
There is a shared conviction in Washington that election returns have a proven
point. [Ref. 34] In early November 1991, Pennsylvanians, with an Eastern European
population of more than 18 percent, took advantage of this. They sent the Republicans
the message that Bush's reaction to the "Bloody Sundays," his handling of Baltic
recognition, and his speech in Kyiv would not go unpunished.
In a special election for the senate seat which was left by John Heinz~who was
killed in an airplane accident—the Democrat and underdog, Harris Wofford, easily
defeated Bush's choice, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh.
Even though the ethnic community advertised the Republican defeat as a protest
vote, the ethnic division of the Republican National Committee (RNC) conducted no post-
election polls. One RNC official explained that the campaign "made no connection
between foreign policy decisions and the domestic campaign." [Ref. 35] Complacent
after decades of relying on anti-communism for the ethnic vote, the RNC's ethnic
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division, once vigorous, had devolved into a handful of "outreach" workers with a
minimal budget. This same nationalities division, created in the 1950's, was the reason
why the Republicans achieved and maintained their stronghold on the ethnic vote during
the Cold War. 13 After the election, one RNC official interviewed admitted that the
ethnic division was not the "best and brightest." The president, on the other hand, did
make the connection between Pennsylvania and Kyiv. The Pennsylvania vote alerted him
to the prospect of losing the ethnics in 1992. [Ref. 8:p. 448] In addition to the protest
vote in Pennsylvania, Bush's Democratic opponents in the 1992 election were making
ample use of "Chicken Kiev" (Appendix A).
I. THE BUREAUCRACY JOINS THE FRAY
Speeches are much harder to reverse than presidential memoranda. Hence, one
purpose of Bush's August speech was to settle the internal bureaucratic dispute which had
erupted over whether or not to recognize Ukraine. The Secretary of State argued for
withholding recognition, while the Secretary of Defense advocated immediate recognition.
Instead of settling the dispute, the speech turned presidential resolve into indecision and
fueled the fire of the bureaucratic debate. Furthermore, the President had to make a
decision before December first, the date set for the Ukrainian referendum on independe-
nce. Immediately after the failed August coup, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly
voted for independence on August 28th and for a countrywide referendum on December
13For a look at the intensity of the Democratic and Republican efforts to court the
ethnic vote in the 1950's and 1960's, see Ref. 15.
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1st. As preliminary polls showed a strong vote for independence, George Bush was again
forced to face the Ukrainian issue.
On October 21st, in an effort to promote the State Department position in Congress,
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles--whom Bush later appointed his emissary to
Kyiv—testified before the Senate Finance Subcommittee, telling Senator Bill Bradley (D-
NJ):
In 1917 [the center] collapsed and they had a period of instability and
independent republics grew up.... But after several years... the center was re-
established... so I do not think we have to necessarily assume that the trend—
which is very clear today of authority and power and sovereignty away from
the center to the republics-is necessarily the last word. [Ref. 36]
While some went to Congress, other officials went to the press to sway decision-
makers. On November 25th, senior aides from State told the Washington Post that:
...diplomatic recognition of Ukraine will be withheld, for example, until the
republic's elected leaders have taken concrete steps to fulfill arms treaty
obligations... these include the 1990 East-West Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty... the 1991 U.S. -Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty...and
international treaties barring development of biological weapons or nuclear
arms capabilities. [Ref. 37:p. A16]
More importantly, the aide indicated that the State Department position depended
upon Moscow: "'We want to see what [Soviet President] Gorbachev and [Russian
President Boris] Yeltsin do,' said one State Department official." [Ref. 37:p. A16] The
same day, an official from the Defense Department released Secretary Cheney's position.
The official said, "Washington should 'get in on the ground floor' with other nations
likely to extend early diplomatic recognition so as 'not to sour our relations with such an
important state.'" [Ref. 37:p. A16] The official criticized the State Department's
position as finding "the breakup of the Soviet Union a worrisome prospect because of a
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'nostalgia' for dealing with a strong, central Soviet government that no longer exists.''
[Ref. 37:p. A16]
Meanwhile, a White House official expressed executive fence-sitting:
I cannot imagine we would hold recognition hostage or try to use recognition
as pressure on them to do something with respect to the center that they didn't
feel in their own judgements appropriate. We will be by and large spectators.
[Ref. 37:p. A16]
It was obvious that "President Bush [had] not tipped his hand about how the dispute
should be settled." [Ref. 37:p. A16]
At the same time, American allies in NATO were cautious. Washington was
reported to be working with London to urge Canada not to grant early recognition.
Canada, however, cited pressure from its large Ukrainian diaspora as the reason why it
would have to act. (In fact, Canada was the second country after Poland to officially
recognize Ukraine.) Germany recommended a compromise which would fall short of full
diplomatic recognition, such as an economic treaty.
Finally, Russia lobbied Washington as well. Russian Foreign minister, Andrei
Kozyrev, met President Bush in late November and urged him not to recognize Ukraine
"because that will play into the hand of the [Russian] extremists." [Ref. 38:p. A35]
J. CONGRESS WEIGHS-IN
On November 20th, shortly before the Senate went into recess, Senator DeConcini
attached the Senate resolution—which now expressed "the sense of the Congress that the
President should recognize the independence of Ukraine" [Ref. 39]-to the Supplemental
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Appropriations Bill. As the senator had hoped, the bill passed easily, undeterred by
debate. The resolution stated:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President-
(1) should recognize Ukraine's independence and undertake steps toward the
establishment of full diplomatic relations with Ukraine should the December
1, 1991 referendum confirm Ukrainian parliament's independence declaration,
and
(2) should use United States assistance, trade, and other programs to support
the Government of Ukraine and encourage the further development of
democracy and a free market in Ukraine. [Ref. 39]
To ensure the resolution had the desired effect on the White House, the senator
faxed the results to Roman Popadiuk in the NSC. Members of the lobby sent the
approved bill to their own White House contacts, hoping it would become the straw which
would break the administration's resistance to recognition. [Ref. 40] It worked. The
President finally agreed to meet the Ukrainian-Americans. The meeting was to be held
on the 27th of November.
K. MEETING THE LOBBY, REVERSING COURSE
The fallout from "Chicken Kiev" and Baltic recognition was too much for the
President to bear. The impact of the Senate resolution, the Wofford election and the
August coup were compounded by the fact that November marked the beginning of the
election year. Bush finally agreed to meet with the Ukrainian-Americans.
From the ethnic community's perspective, the meeting had many fathers. Ukraine
2000 started its efforts to secure the meeting in February of 1991, while other groups
such as the Ukrainian National Association lobbied as well. The President had rejected
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several proposals for the meeting, but the lobby continued the press. Roman Popadiuk
submitted a proposal for a meeting through his NSC channels. One of the President's
public liaison officers-who had personal contact with Ukraine 2000—intercepted the NSC
proposal and combined it with previous requests, arranging the a proposal that the
President "could not refuse." [Ref. 40] He could not refuse because the political stakes
were finally high enough to make him accept: by the time the proposal reached his desk
the Senate had passed its "Sense of the Congress," Cheney had become an advocate for
the meeting and was bringing Scowcroft over to his side, and Harris Wofford had just
crushed Dick Thornburgh in the Pennsylvania election.
On Tuesday the 27th, the Ukrainian-American delegation waited for the President
in the Roosevelt Room of the White House's West Wing. Anticipating further stonewall-
ing, they had drawn up their argument, appointed a spokesperson and prepared for the
confrontation. Secretary Cheney was not at the meeting. He had met with Bush, Baker
and Scowcroft before the meeting, however, to convince the president of the wisdom of
early recognition.
Surprising the delegation, Bush responded to their opening remarks by saying that
he was looking forward to watching fair and free voting in Ukraine. He said he was
anxious to salute the vote of the people of Ukraine and to work with Ukraine on details:
In his description of the "details," the President talked about nuclear weapons,
CSCE and the CFE and other treaties. Quickly he added that he had no
reason to believe that these things were stumbling blocks to recognition.
Indeed, he emphasized that Ukraine had said all of the right things; "all of the
right signs" have been coming from Ukraine. He emphasized that he wants
to move quickly. . . .He noted that Ukraine is "entitled to independence. " [Ref.
41]
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After the meeting, members of the delegation immediately sent word to their Rukh
contacts about the President's softened stand. This news, in addition to the victory of the
Senate resolution, was widely advertised and enthusiastically welcomed in Ukraine in the
days before the referendum. 14
L. "WELCOMING" THE VOTE, GRANTING RECOGNITION
Whether or not the resolution and White House meeting had any impact on the
referendum is difficult to determine. Before the vote, the support for independence was
predicted to be 70 percent. The actual results were an overwhelming 90.32 percent.
[Ref. 42:p. 1]
Before all the votes were tallied, the administration announced it would not
recognize Ukraine immediately, but would "welcome" a vote for independence and send
an emissary to Kyiv. [Ref. 43:p. Al] Bush may have believed that this compromise, on
the heels of the meeting, was enough to keep the ethnic vote without having to betray
Gorbachev. The Washington Post made it clear that this tactic would not work.
Alongside the administration's announcement, the press highlighted the ethnic communi-
ty's reaction:
"We're laughing at Bush, that he is taking so long. It's a moral shame.
America stands for democracy, and here we are siding with the Soviets," said
Natalie Gawdiak, of Silver Spring, who married a Ukrainian American and
has embraced the culture. [Ref. 44:p. A 14]
14This was confirmed by several Americans and Ukrainians who were in Kyiv during
the referendum.
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The administration was forced to compromise again. In what appeared to be the best
way to support the failing Gorbachev and accept the inevitability of Ukrainian indepen-
dence, the President waited until December 25th—the day Gorbachev resigned-to grant
formal recognition. Contrary to State Department desires, Ukraine was not required to
sign CFE, START and NPT before it was granted U.S. recognition.
When it was all over, the Soviet Union was gone, Gorbachev was out and Ukraine
took its place among the states of the world.
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IV. THE LOBBY: IMMIGRATION AND ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the American Jewish lobby, the Ukrainian-American lobby was neither large
nor wealthy. How did they get power? To understand why such a small interest group
was able to enter the bureaucratic process, it is important to understand: 1) the nature
of ethnic politics and the role it plays in an election year; 2) the character of the lobby
and the reasons why it remained highly politicized despite patterns of assimilation; and
3) the diplomatic importance of the concept of Ukrainian independence. This chapter will
look at the character of the lobby as determined by immigration and ethnic politics.
The success of the Ukrainian-American lobby in 1991 was the result of a decades-
long struggle for political influence. Assimilationists in the last two decades pointed to
a steady decline in their influence since the 1950's. As 1991 showed, however, this was
not the case. A change in the structure of the lobby in the 1970's increased its influence,
while making it harder to detect as a lobby. This will be examined in the following
chapter. Despite its diffusion in the 1970's, the lobby retained the political characteristics
imparted on it by its three waves of immigration. This chapter will focus on those
immigrations.
Three waves of immigration gave the lobby its electoral significance, its political
focus (on Ukrainian liberation) and a host of internal disputes which hampered both.
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Daniel Moynihan argues that "the immigration process is the single most important
determinant of American foreign policy." [Ref. 45:pp. 22-23] For the Ukrainian-
American lobby, immigration is the primary determinant of its character and political
activity. Three things deserve note. First, the third wave, comprising mostly Displaced
Persons from the Second World War, was the most politically active immigration.
Second, the urban areas in which the last two waves settled gave the immigrants electoral
significance. Third, each wave brought with it political, religious and cultural disagree-
ments from the homeland, producing in-fighting among Ukrainian-American organizations
which persists. 15 This aspect explains both the large number of the community's
organizations and its periods of political ineffectiveness. 16 To achieve the cohesion
displayed in the letter writing campaigns and independence demonstrations of the 1980's
and early 1990's, the lobby had to overcome this self-imposed obstacle.
B. IMMIGRATION AND POLITICIZATION
The first Ukrainian came to America in 1608. Ivan Bohdan arrived in Jamestown
with Captain John Smith, who fought in Eastern Europe against the Turks, and fled from
captivity through Ukraine. [Ref. 46: p. 1] The first large immigration of Ukrainians,
however, came as part of the great southern and eastern European immigration of
15In 1990, one Ukrainian visitor to the U.S. remarked, "talking with Ukrainian-
Americans is like being in a time capsule. Some things they fight about, we forgot years
ago in Ukraine."
l6To have influence, lobbyists must convince members of Congress that they can
mobilize voters. Political in-fighting created countervailing factions in the lobby, thus no
one group could claim to influence the entire voting community.
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1880-1914. [Ref. 47:p. 665] According to U.S. immigration records, there were at least
500,000 first- and second-generation Ukrainians living in the United States by 1914.
Most of this early group came from the provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia, then
part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. [Ref. 48: pp. 39-40]
Because Ukraine was non-existent, and political awareness was low, most of these
immigrants did not call themselves "Ukrainians. " Some defined themselves as "Rusyns,
"
some "Ruthenians," "Russians," "Poles," or "Austrians," depending upon the area from
which they came. Unlike the homelands of immigrants like the Irish, Americans were
generally unaware of a separate country of Ukraine. This has forced subsequent
generations to explain the political reality, thus reinforcing their ethnic identity.
Furthermore, because of the political domination of their homeland—by Turks, Russians,
Poles, Nazi's and, finally, by Soviets—liberation became the hallmark of Ukrainian
nationalism, and of Ukrainian-American ethnic awareness.
The second wave of immigrants came between 1920 and 1939, bringing 20,000
Ukrainians. It was marked by fractious in-fighting among three groups: the Socialists,
the Monarchists, and the Nationalists. [Ref. 49] The last group, rooted in the failed
attempt for Ukrainian independence of 1917-1920, prevailed. Growing American anti-
socialist sentiment and the large influx of anti-communist Ukrainians after World War II
helped them.
The third and final wave brought another 85,000 between 1947 and 1955. From
1955 to its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union restricted immigration to about 5,000.
While some estimate the diaspora in the U.S as low as 487,600 [Ref. 49: p. 998], others
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maintain that it is as high as 1,500,000 [Ref. 48:p. 45]. The 1980 census found 1.5
million Americans of Ukrainian descent. The commonly used figure today, however, is
740,000. The cause of the disparity in estimates may have something to do with the
problems of self-definition and domestic understanding described above. 17
Unlike the first wave which settled primarily in the coal regions of rural
Pennsylvania, the second and third waves came to the cities. Six cities became and
remain the community's centers of population: New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago. These cities also comprise important swing voting
districts, making immigration patterns key to political importance. Ukrainian-Americans
generally live in areas of high East European settlement. The East European population
exceeds ten percent in 12 states: Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin (see
Appendix E).
The third wave differed from previous immigrations socially, economically and
politically. Whereas, previous groups were generally illiterate and fleeing poverty,
postwar immigrants were urban-dwelling professionals fleeing political persecution. 18
Until they recognized the longevity of the Soviet regime, the postwar immigrants viewed
17The lack of precise data is important for its comment on the perceived power of the
ethnic lobby. When President Bush agreed to meet with Ukrainian-American leaders in
November of 1991, he acknowledged their political clout during an election year. Yet
he did so without any real data on the broader community's size or voting habits. The
lobby's power has less to do with the actual number of voters than with the perception
of its impact on swing votes in the urban districts in which the majority of Ukrainian-
Americans live.
18For statistics on the third wave of Ukrainian immigrants, see Ref. 47.
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their American home as temporary. Highly politicized, they had an extraordinary
tradition of self-organization and added numerous organizations to the two existing
umbrella groups: 19
Indeed, few newcomers to the New World were as cohesively and tightly knit
as these post-Second World War refugee. Over 40 percent of the youth, 60
percent of the adults, and about 70 percent of the women belonged to one or
more organizations. This predilection for organization can be explained, in
part, by the fact that a large number of the community activists and leaders
from Western Ukraine, and especially Galicia, which had a strong tradition
of grass-roots organization, were included in this latest wave of newcomers.
[Ref. 50:p. 204]
That this last wave came from the highly nationalistic western region of Galicia was
a mixed blessing for the American diaspora. The fervent bonds which preserved a high
degree of cultural, linguistic and religious awareness even into the 1990's, also preserved
political disputes. One split preserved was between the Bandera and Mel'nyk factions of
the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Bandera faction prevailed in the
American diaspora, but failed to sustain large membership for two reasons. First, their
integral nationalism alienated many in the more assimilated generations and indeed among
the newer immigrants. Second, their approach raised the question of divided loyalties
19The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) formed an aid committee
(the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), to lobby for eased
immigration. The pro-Communist Ukrainians countered with a campaign to block aid and
immigration accurately predicting the influx anti-Communist DP's as a threat to their
viability. The American Jewish Committee, on the other hand, supported the Ukrainian-
American lobby by sponsoring a campaign to increase public sympathy for refugees. The
pro-DP lobby prevailed. By 1948 a bill passed allowing 205,000 DP's (later 395,000) to
enter the U.S. [Ref. 50:p. 199].
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among politicians they lobbied. 20 The latter is a common criticism of American ethnic
lobbies. As the American Jewish lobby shows, however, it does not have to be debilitat-
ing. The second and third phases of the lobby were successful largely because they
avoided purely nationalistic appeals for their homeland. Instead, they phrased their
message in terms of American security interests. These groups saw an independent
Ukraine as the only way to balance the expansionist Russian threat to European and
American security. This idea is central to and provides the continuity for the three phases
which will be addressed here.
C. THE THIRD WAVE AND PARTY POLITICS
The postwar immigrants differed from existing American ethnic groups because
their political interest was almost exclusively foreign policy. 21 The Irish and German
ethnics failed to prevent U.S. alliance with Britain against Germany in the two World
Wars. These groups could be appeased, at least partially, by socio-economic promises.
Arriving just as the U.S. was abandoning isolationism and turning outward, the DP's
could not be so assuaged. As described above, Eisenhower dislodged the ethnics from
the Democratic party in 1952. [Ref. 15:p. 143]
In 1968, this strategy again proved successful. Nixon's ethnic emphasis, coupled
with the Republican's sturdy anti-communist plank, kept the ethnics in the GOP during
20For an account of the ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),
see Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, (Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990).
21There is a parallel between the third wave of Ukrainians and the later Cuban
immigration which also subordinates domestic issues to its foreign policy cause.
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the 1970's and 1980's. Even their more assimilated children, who tended toward a
human rights focus if they were politically active at all, remained largely loyal to the anti-
communist rhetoric. Reagan's "evil empire" approach to Soviet policy, his elevating
Captive Nations Week into a White House observance and his appointing members of the
Ukrainian-American community to diplomatic and political positions strengthened the
bond. 22 In 1988 George Bush, enjoying the fruits and the work of his predecessors,
received 85 percent of the East European ethnic vote. By 1992, however, the support fell
to 55 percent.
The Republican complacency regarding the ethnic vote was not unfounded. The
mobilization between 1988-1991 surprised the Ukrainian-Americans themselves. Many
of the younger ethnics shared Washington's skepticism of their political significance.
They attributed the lobby's mixed success partly to the nationalistic tenor and fractious
nature of the postwar organizations:
While they reinvigorated the Ukrainian community and greatly expanded its
range of activities, their high degree of politicization, particularly the
Melnykite-Banderite feud, has made the Ukrainian-American community the
most politically fragmented in the West. [Ref. 50:p. 251]
Hence, the preference for fraternal and church groups over political organizations
was seen as the beginning of the end of the lobby. Assimilation reinforced this
prediction. In 1980 only 123,000 of 730,000 Ukrainian-Americans declared Ukrainian
22In 1982, President Reagan appointed as Ambassador to Bermuda the Captive Nations
resolution's author, Professor Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown University. Elevating
Captive Nations Week to a White House observance, he made Dobriansky and others part
of these observances.
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to be their primary language [Ref. 50:p. 255]. Moreover, all indications of membership
in organizations, churches and associations were around 100,000.
If assimilation and the decline of political organizations indicated the lobby's failure,
what explains their influence upon Congress in 1991?
Even though the Ukrainian-Americans followed the traditional patterns of
assimilation (inter-marriage, use of English, etc.) they did not lose the political objective
of liberation. In a survey of Ukrainian American youth, 82 percent of the respondents
agreed that being Ukrainian "carried with it the obligation to work toward a free and
independent Ukraine." [Ref. 47:p. 1008] Even the increasing use of English and
decreasing involvement in ethnic groups is deceiving, since large numbers maintained
Ukrainian as a second language, and maintained community and cultural awareness
through Saturday School and youth groups. Hence, when travel to Ukraine became
possible in the late 1980' s, a large number of these "assimilated" ethnics used their
business and professional connections to launch joint ventures, and form political
exchanges and institutions in the U.S. and in Ukraine. 23
D. SUMMARY
As this chapter has attempted to show, a pattern of assimilation did not preclude the
lobby's upsurge in the 1980's. This is because of the strong political component
(liberation) in Ukrainian cultural awareness, and the persistence of cultural awareness
230ne example is the U.S. -Ukraine Foundation, an organization promoting democracy
and a market economy in Ukraine. In the U.S., the foundation hosts Ukrainian deputies
and delegations. In Kyiv it helps deputies by providing resources for the making of
public policy.
41
despite overt patterns of assimilation. The political nature of the postwar immigration,
coupled with its settlement in swing voting districts, reenforced the lobby's political
potential.
The children of the third wave of immigration make up a large number of active
Ukrainian-American lobbyists. Of those interviewed for this study, the majority were
children of third wave immigrants and all had similar political views. Those views were
marked by membership in the Republican party, work in the Reagan and Bush
administrations and disillusionment with Bush policies which caused all of those
interviewed to vote Democrat in 1992, despite Republican party membership. Finally, as
the following chapter will address, the Republican's catering to ethnics and monopoly
on anti-communism could not overcome Bush's anti-independence stand during the
sweeping changes of 1989-1991. This forces a reassessment of the lobby's seeming
failure in the Cold War period. As will be argued below, the lobby underwent three
phases before liberation. Adapting to the domestic and international political climate,
each chose a different structure and strategy. Yet each built upon the initial success of
the Captive Nations idea, and the fundamental ideological problem it posed for American
policymakers.
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V. THREE PHASES OF THE LOBBY
A. INTRODUCTION
Just as the character of the lobby was determined by three waves of immigration,
the strategy of the lobby since 1948 was determined by three phases of domestic and
international politics: the immediate postwar period, the rise of human rights in
diplomacy, and the post-Cold War period. The purpose of this chapter is to complete the
picture outlined in the previous chapter by examining successes and failures of the lobby.
The story is not one of gradual assimilation and decline, rather of each generation
choosing tactics based upon the domestic and international context.
Obviously, the list of characters and accomplishments examined here cannot be
comprehensive. The aim is to show the lobby's political evolution through primary
examples. Therefore, it will look at three concepts which correspond to three phases of
the lobby: Captive Nations (World War II to the present), human rights (1976 to the
present) and Rukh support organizations (1989 to the present).
In the 1980's, the lobby's human rights focus was new in that it mobilized dormant
generations of Ukrainian-Americans. In this way it gained the grass-roots support and
alliances needed to motivate Congress to support the recognition legislation. However,
human rights and congressional lobbying are not new for Ukrainian-Americans. In fact,
for the postwar generation of Ukrainian-Americans, human rights and liberation of their
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homeland were coterminous. They were embodied in the Captive Nations Week
Resolution which Congress passed as Public Law 86-90 in 1959.
B. PHASE ONE: CAPTIVE NATIONS, FAILURE OR FOUNDATION?
We in America have stood from the day of our birth for the emancipation of
people throughout the world who were living unwillingly under governments
which were not of their own choice. The thing which we have held more
sacred than any other is that all just government rests upon the consent of the
governed, that principle has been flouted by the strong, and only the weak
have suffered. 24
As described above, Captive Nations Week was part of the Republican effort to
dislodge the ethnics from the Democratic Party after the Second World War. Authored
by a Ukrainian-American, the community embraced the concept as its primary vehicle for
keeping liberation of Ukraine on the political agenda. Successive administrations paid
little more than lip service to the idea. In fact, some tried to abandon it in practice all
together. The Soviet reaction was quite different, however. Understanding how volatile
their nationalities problem was, Soviet leaders were threatened by the yearly observance.
Unaware, the U.S. never exploited the Soviets' achilles heel.
The small group of university professors who spoke out for the Captive Nations idea
argued that:
The nationalism of the non-Russian nations was constantly treated by leading
American scholars and journalists as "separatism" or "fascism" and the very
existence of some of these nations was negated. [Ref. 16: p. 97]
24Woodrow Wilson in San Diego, September 19, 1919. Cited in Ref. 16:p. 97.
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Nonetheless, they found many in Washington who supported their cause. Secretary
of State Dean Acheson on June 26, 1951 before the house Foreign Affairs Committee,
said:
The ruling power of Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules
a greatly extended empire. This is the challenge our foreign policy is
required to meet.
It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which
Russia has grown in the last five hundred years form the Duchy of Moscovy
to a vast empire has got to be stopped. [Ref. 16: p. 93]
But neither the Secretary's belated awareness of Russian expansionism, nor the other
proponents of national self-determination could compete with the official policy of
granting the Soviets a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The concept had to be
codified in law if it was to carry any weight at all.
The Captive Nations Week concept was signed into law. Passed by a unanimous
vote of Congress on July 17, 1959, the resolution called for a week of commemoration
every third week in July, and declared that:
it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty
and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should
be steadfastly kept alive. [Ref. 16:p. 99]
Even though every president since Eisenhower has observed the occasion, every one
has also sought to free himself of its restrictions. In 1977 Jimmy Carter, although he was
seen by many as the "human rights president," canceled the proclamation for the sake of
detente. After intense criticism, he proclaimed the Week. In 1990, Ukraine declared
sovereignty, and President Bush eliminated mention of Ukraine in his Captive Nations
address because the Resolution now had become a real possibility. The lobby was able
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to "minimize negatives by having other nations taken out of the declaration as [White
House] staff would not include Ukraine" [Ref. 51 :p. 2]. Thus, the speech did not reflect
the hard line against Ukrainian sovereignty which the original speech writers intended.
Why, if the majority of scholars agreed that by the 1970's Captive Nations Week
was nothing more than "National Hot Dog Month," was the speech still controversial in
1990? The answer lies in a general American misunderstanding of nationalism, and
subsequent underestimation of the resolution's importance in diplomacy. It is not the
purpose of this paper to detail the misconceptions of nationalism, but American mirror
imaging of Soviet nationalities with American ethnic groups is one result. For this
reason, many were unaware how sharply the Soviet nerves were struck by the resolution.
One American who protested the resolution was George Kennan, father of Soviet
"containment" policy. A Soviet specialist in the U.S. Foreign Service, he accompanied
the first U.S ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1933, and assumed that post in 1952.
Kennan' s view of nationalism was common to most Cold War policymakers. He believed
that patriotism, or love of state, was admirable, while nationalism, love of any unit
smaller than the state was "a terrible disease of the human spirit" [Ref. 52:p. 80]. This
Manichean view of nationalism not only ignores extensive research on the subject, but has
proven inadequate in explaining crises in Bosnia, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh as well as
disputes in Quebec, Catalonia, indeed the entire world in the 20th century. Yet, the
misunderstanding of nationalism helps to explain U.S. condemnation of democratic
movements in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics in order to maintain good relations
with the communists. Kennan found Captive Nations Week a nuisance if not an obstacle
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to this goal and, "in 1961, [he] conditioned his acceptance as Ambassador to Yugoslavia
on President Kennedy's promise not to issue the annual proclamation. The President
nevertheless did, thanks to Chicago's Mayor Daley's intervention. " [Ref. 18]
In Moscow, Khrushchev's protests were more vehement than Kennan's, as described
above. In 1982, TASS condemned President Reagan's speech for "rudeness," "cynicism"
and "interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union." [Ref. 18:p. 6] That same
year Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute on American and Canadian Affairs called
the Week a threat to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 18:p. 6] Strangely, this amazing admission
went unnoticed by national security staffs and the professional sovietologists. Along with
verbal condemnation, the Soviets attempted to overshadow the event in international
affairs. They adopted a policy of scheduling events to coincide with the observance, such
as the signing of the non-proliferation pact [Ref. 18:p. 6].
Thus, even though many in Congress and in the American public had no idea of the
resolution's importance, policymakers in Moscow did. It is not surprising that in April
1993, even after the Soviet collapse, Russian leaders still lobbied Washington to abandon
Captive Nations Week. [Ref. 53]
What, then, was the importance of Captive Nations Week for the effort to secure
diplomatic recognition of Ukraine? Most Ukrainian-Americans maintain that administra-
tions paid only lip service to the idea, and that it could not overcome centuries of
American political focus upon Moscow. At the same time, they recognize that it kept the
concept of an independent Ukraine on the American political agenda. While the
congressmen may not have appreciated the full weight of the concepts they proclaimed
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on the floor, in some administrations the White House and the Kremlin listened with
discomfort. The lengths to which Soviets went to overshadow the week~and the vehe-
mence with which the Soviets protested it-indicates that the concept, embodied in law and
renewed in yearly symbolism and practice, was more significant than the policymaking
elites ever knew.
C. PHASE TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HELSINKI COMMISSION,
ASSIMILATION OR RESURGENCE?
Although the younger ethnics~the first generation born, raised and educated in the
United States-believed Captive Nations kept Ukraine on the political map, few felt the
Executive paid much more than lip service to it. The same was said of the traditional
Ukrainian-American organizations. Even so, there was an increasing public interest in
human rights and in political prisoners, many of whom were in the Soviet Union. Seizing
the opportunity to diversify their approach, many young members of the community
hitched their star to human rights in order to keep the idea of Ukrainian independence
alive in Washington. They did so despite criticism of "betrayal" by the more traditional
factions, such as the Banderites.
During this same period in the 1970's, many individual Ukrainian-Americans had
worked their way up the governmental ladder. In many respects it was these individuals
and not the organized groups which became the most effective conduits of information
about Ukraine to Congress and the Executive. By the 1980's many had gained
appointments in the Republican administrations, while others were members or staff
members in Congress or in other government and non-government agencies. Some of
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them made careers of "not being a Ukrainian-Americans," while others split their efforts
between ethnic and governmental organizations.
Hence, by the 1980's the lobby had taken on an unconventional structure, one
comprising formal and informal personal contacts throughout the government, and one not
easily discernable.
1. Human Rights: Passing the Baton.
To the morally-based National Captive Nations Council (NCNC), the human
rights issue was old hat. The Committee was diligent in explaining to Congress the
difference between the Carterite focus on civil rights in authoritarian Latin America and
the hierarchy of human rights: personal, civil and national. [Ref. 18:p. 11] After 1975,
however, this fight was taken up by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki Commission.
The numerous "dear colleague" letters which alerted Congress to Soviet
human rights violations, sprang largely from this office. In addition to these letters, the
Commission was involved in the unconventional diplomacy (compared with traditional
bilateral negotiations) of the delegation. Unlike the State and Congressional delegations,
staff members (including some Ukrainian-Americans) were full members of the groups
which negotiated directly with the 52 members of CSCE. While the State Department
preferred to keep the delegations' demands abstract, Commission members insisted upon
naming names of Soviet political prisoners. The Soviets had to sit and listen.
Consequently, there was a noticeable difference between the Madrid conference of 1983
and the Vienna meeting of 1989. As one Helsinki staff member described it, "the
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Commission had strengthened the spine of State" and by Vienna, the U.S. had taken the
lead in human rights issues.
2. The Helsinki Commission and the Lobby.
Because of the Commission's structure and mission, it became a natural
vehicle for Ukrainian-Americans to lobby Congress. Not only formal political and
fraternal organizations, but individual members of the community could be heard in this
forum. When asked whether the Commission went to the emigration for information or
vice versa, one senior staff member replied:
Both. Sometimes there's an issue for which we'll seek them out, but they
often come to us, and they come in all kinds. The state groups have many
varied organizations, we even have a dentist who gets very involved in these
things. [Ref. 54]
Regarding which groups the Commission sought out for information, the staff member
answered:
We use only the Ukrainian American Council, since it's the umbrella
organization for all the groups. I don't get into the in-fighting among groups.
[Ref. 54]
In order to maintain linkage during the 1980's, the lobby kept constant
pressure on Congress through the Commission-as well as directly through Congressional
offices—to codify Ukrainian interests. They collaborated on several pieces of legislation,
including: the 1988 legislation prohibiting any U.S. official from taking part in the
Millennial celebrations of Kievan Rus' until liberation of the Ukrainian Catholic and
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches; the May 19, 1989 Senate letter to Secretary
Gorbachev protesting Soviet harassment of Ukrainians campaigning for human, religious,
cultural and national rights; the November 15, 1989 Senate letter asking President Bush
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to urge President Gorbachev to legalize the banned Ukrainian churches; the 1990 Joint
resolution authorizing a week of commemoration for the victims of the 1932-1933 forced
famine in Ukraine; and the 1991 Senate bill requiring all aid to go directly to the
republics of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the late 1980's, the lobby had established a well-exercised network
in Washington. It provided the framework for the next phase of the lobby. The
extraordinary events in Ukraine precipitated the this final phase: mobilization of the
entire community through Rukh25 support groups.
D. PHASE THREE: RUKH SUPPORT, MOBILIZING THE LARGER
COMMUNITY
Rukh support groups marked the third and final phase of the lobby before Ukrainian
independence. Founded on the Captive Nations concept, these new groups used the
political ties made in the human rights phase and established some new ones. The
community formed 23 Rukh support organizations, designating the Washington office,
Ukraine 2000, their umbrella organization and government liaison office. Their efforts
built upon the Congressional Commission of the Famine in Ukraine, the Millennial
celebrations of Kievan Rus', the famine commemoration legislation and, finally, on Rukh
support and diplomatic recognition. Two things set this phase apart from the previous
two. First, the new groups had daily contact with democrats in Ukraine, using electronic
25Rukh, or Movement, was the common name for the Democratic Movement for the
Restructuring of Ukraine: a writers union founded in September, 1989.
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mail. This allowed them real time intelligence which State and CIA lacked. Second, the
once solid bond between the ethnics and the Republican Party was failing.
1. Evolution of Rukh Support Groups.
The final phase began in the early nineteen eighties with the Congressional
Commission on the Famine in Ukraine. The commission's findings, published June 20,
1990 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, were hailed in Ukraine as "unmatched by
any investigation" of the Soviet system in Ukraine. [Ref. 55 :p. 3] The newly-revealed
information on the Soviets' forced starvation of five million Ukrainians, like the 1986
Chornobyl disaster, was a primary catalyst for the independence movement. The famine
legislation met significant resistance in both Houses. Thus the lobby, still in its fledgling
stages in its human rights orientation, pursued ad hoc lobbying techniques.
The second important breakthrough for the lobby was the 1988 celebration of
the millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. Again, the legislation was controversial.
Moscow wanted to keep the focus of the event entirely on Russia, not Ukraine. This
reinforced the Russian claim that Kievan Rus' is a Russian and not a Ukrainian legacy;
hence, that Ukraine has been a territory of Russia since A.D. 988 and has no legitimate
claim to independence. As they did for the famine commission, Ukrainian-Americans
formed an ad hoc committee from their existing groups. The legislation passed the Senate
easily, but several members of the House wanted all references to Ukraine removed and
replaced with "USSR." [Ref. 21] Additionally, the members wanted removed all
references to the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The Churches,
banned by Stalin, were still harshly repressed by Gorbachev. Ukrainian-American
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organizations and the ad hoc committee refused to support the proposed changes. A
logjam resulted and was not broken until the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine sent a letter
condemning the legislation as a "communist plot." It passed ten days later.
The significance of the commemoration legislation was that it prohibited all
American officials from attending any commemorative event until the banned churches
were legalized. This affected the upcoming Moscow summit. Reagan's attendance at the
events would have lent further legitimacy to Gorbachev's harsh policy toward the
churches and the fledgling independence movement in Western Ukraine. Not until
sponsors of the initiative informed White House staff was President Reagan aware that
he could not attend the millennial celebrations in Moscow to which Gorbachev had invited
him.
Both of these cases were important to Ukrainian-Americans because they
reestablished a formal lobby in Washington. This lobby was cemented by the third major
breakthrough, the formation of Rukh. Rukh's founding congress took place in September
of 1989. The following month, Volodymyr Yavorivsky came to America. He was the
first Ukrainian parliamentarian to visit the United States. He was charismatic and
inspiring of the younger generation of ethnics. Ukrainian-Americans who did not belong
to existing ethnic organizations began to form Rukh support organizations. Large groups
formed in Chicago and Detroit, smaller organizations formed in California and in states
with lower concentrations of Ukrainians. The Washington, D.C. group, the Washington
Committee in Support of Ukraine, or Ukraine 2000, was designated the government
relations organization for the 23 committees which were organized nation-wide. Its
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primary tasks were submitting testimony to Congress and making sure that Rukh members
met with influential members of the White House staff, Congress, Defense, NSC, the
press and various Washington think tanks. The second task was made possible because
Ukraine 2000" s director was a former Reagan administration Assistant Attorney General
who retained several close contacts in the upper echelons of the Bush administration.
Ukraine 2000 hosted several Rukh members. Many of them had spent several
years in Soviet prison camps and were staunchly pro-democratic. Members of Congress
eagerly met the men, posing for pictures to send home to constituents. For many who
met them, the pro-democratic, ethnically-inclusive demeanor of these men dispelled ideas
that Ukraine was anti-semitic and virulently nationalistic. [Ref. 21] It became more and
more apparent to these members that the pro-Moscow stand of the Bush Administration
could not be reconciled with basic American interests in supporting democracy in other
countries. It was also apparent that alienating the future leaders of potentially the second
largest country in Europe could have detrimental long term effects on European and
American national security. Thus, many members of Congress developed their own stand
on post-Cold War Soviet policy. And it was directly opposed to the Bush stand.
The watershed event of this process was Mykhailo Horyn's Washington visit
in September, 1990. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze sent communiques to Bush, Baker and
Scowcroft, urging them to avoid high-level meetings with Horyn. Nonetheless, Horyn
met with more people, at a higher level (including four Cabinet members), than had any
Ukrainian or Ukrainian-American. He made "an extraordinary contribution to advancing
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the cause of an independent Ukraine." [Ref. 56] 26 The most important meeting of his
trip was his hour and 20 minute meeting with Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. The
Secretary found Horyn very "believable," even-measured, truly democratic and
"unscarred" by his experience in the gulag. After the 1990 meeting, Ukrainian-
Americans noticed a change in DoD's position on Ukraine. The Defense Department
seemed more attentive to the strategic importance of Ukraine, as well as to matters of
financial aid and assistance. Thus, DoD's stand was similar to that of Congress:
supporting the pro-democratic movement in Ukraine was the only way to ensure good
relations with what could emerge as the second largest state in Europe.
Visitors from Ukraine who arrived without diaspora assistance did not meet
with Horyn's success. While protesters in Kyiv demanded his resignation, Ukraine's
Foreign Minister, Vitaly Masol, was denied meetings with the President and Secretary of
State in 1990. He refused to meet with the Deputy Secretary of State. As a result, he
had no meetings with U.S. government officials during his stay.
26Among those with whom Horyn met were: David Atwood, President, National
Democratic Institute; Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General; Carl Gershman, Chairman
of the National Endowment for Democracy; Senators Richard Lugar, Dennis DeConcini,
Bill Bradley; Congressman Frank Wolf; William Kristol, Chief of Staff, Office of the
Vice President and Jon Glasman, Assistant to the Vice President and Deputy to the Vice
President for National Security Affairs; Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak and other
resident scholars at the American Enterprise Institute; Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; Curtis Kamman,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav
Affairs; Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO; Bruce Gelb, Director, USIA; Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter; and members of the press,
including the Christian Science Monitor and Radio Liberty.
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2. Stepan Khmara and the Mobilization of the Larger
Community.
Ukraine 2000, while an important part of the lobby, was by no means the only
organization active in the third phase. The entire community was mobilized by the events
taking place in Ukraine. Ukrainian-Americans who left or never joined an ethnic group
were inspired to use their language skills, their business and professional connections—
and, most importantly, their votes—to help Ukrainians achieve independence. As the
following chapter will argue, mobilization of the voting community is essential to
influencing Congress. Also essential is rallying the disparate organizations under one
banner. The Stepan Khmara case achieved both ends.
As described above, the Khmara case solidified the lobby-Congress
relationship and laid the foundations for the last lobbying effort before the Ukrainian
referendum on independence: the concurrent resolutions urging President Bush to
recognize Ukraine. These resolutions will be examined in detail in the next chapter.
Their effect on the Bush White House, coming as they did in an election year, helped the
lobby receive a meeting with the President and ultimately change his position on
recognition.
E. SUMMARY
Although all of the lobby's successes and failures could not be examined here, the
most important political movements have been highlighted. The Captive Nations idea laid
the foundations for the human rights phase of the lobby and for the recognition of Ukraine
in 1991. Many inside and outside the lobby have discounted its importance, but the CNW
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concept's impact on U.S. -Soviet relations must not be confused with widespread US
domestic ignorance of the concept. CNW was important because: 1) U.S. decision-
makers understood it (and disagreed with it), even if the majority of Congress didn't; 2)
Soviets understood it and abhorred it; 3) Administrations were powerless to completely
abandon the observance because it was established in law; and 4) it established a lobby-
Congress relationship, giving them a gauge by which to measure Administration's
adherence (or lack of it) to the resolution in Soviet foreign policy. The law ensured the
administration's making Congress and the lobby permanent considerations (of varying
degrees) in Soviet foreign policymaking.
Like the immediate postwar generation, the lobby of the 1970's and 1980's adapted
to political realities of the period. The increasing emphasis on ethnicity and human rights
in the 1970's contributed the second phase of the lobby. This "shift" to human rights
changed the character of the lobby for two reasons: 1) it allowed them to keep liberation
on the political agenda while using politically cogent language of human rights; and 2) it
made the lobby more difficult to detect as a lobby (because the lines were blurred, the
bodies used were not only ethnic groups, but NGO's, positions in government, staff, etc).
Rukh support groups marked the final phase of the lobby. Founded on the CNW
concept, they used the political ties made by the human rights phase along with
establishing new ones. Their efforts built upon the Congressional Commission of the
Famine in Ukraine, the millennial celebrations, the famine commemoration legislation,
and finally, Rukh support and recognition.
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The meeting with the president was the culmination of all of these efforts. First,
it showed that the administration recognized the lobby as a consideration in policymaking.
Even though their numbers were small, their perceived power in an election year could
not be completely dismissed. Second, coming on the heels of Senate Concurrent
Resolution 65, it indicated the Congress-lobby solidarity against the Bush stand. Finally,
the meeting brought together members of otherwise fractious components of the lobby
under one banner: diplomatic recognition.
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VI. CONGRESS
Even if a foreign policy issue does not require Congressional support-as for
ratifying a treaty or approving an ambassador-the President still recognizes the danger
of acting contrary to the will of Congress. He recognizes that an unpopular move "will
generate opposition to other policies, perhaps including policies in the domestic sector."
[Ref. 57: p. 75] A president's hesitance to defy Congress is reinforced in an election
year, especially if the Executive-Legislative relationship is less than cooperative. Such
was the case in 1991. That is the reason why the Senate's passing a Sense of the Senate
urging President Bush to recognize Ukraine following the December 1, 1991 referendum
was so important. That is also the reason why the Ukrainian-American lobby turned their
full attention to lobbying for the resolution. This chapter will show the reasons why the
lobby was successful.
The 90 percent support for independence in the referendum sounded the death knell
for the Soviet Union. The U.S. backing of Ukrainian independence, even before the
referendum, sealed the fate of President Gorbachev. However, before November 28,
1991, U.S. policy had been to fully support Gorbachev and the preservation of the Soviet
Union. It was not until the manifestation of substantial domestic pressure, displayed by
Congress' November 20, 1991 resolution urging the president to recognize Ukraine, that
Bush reversed his policy toward the Soviet Union.
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Why, after decades of seeming indifference to the Ukrainian-American ethnic lobby,
did individual members echo their letters on the Senate and House floors as they backed
the resolutions against the President's policy?
The first part of the answer lies in a shift in the ethnic lobby's tactics for achieving
"liberation" at the same time the Congress was shifting to a more active role in foreign
policy. This gave a human rights foundation to the same coalition that would get the
recognition legislation passed. The second half of the answer lies in the benefit each
member saw in supporting or not supporting the legislation. While the majority of
members preferred to defer to the president, enough members were motivated to support
Ukrainian independence, whether for parochial reasons, or interest in policy, to pass the
legislation and affect policy.
This said, the first two sections of this chapter will show the Congress-lobby
partnership in human rights formed in the 1980's. The third and fourth sections will
address the reasons political scientists predicted that the lobby would fail to sway policy-
makers, and the reasons the literature was disproved. The final section will address
congressional motivation to support the lobby.
A. CAPTIVE NATIONS AND THE HELSINKI COMMISSION: MERGING
INTERESTS
Since the Congress founded the Helsinki Commission in 1976, members had tried
to maintain a linkage between human rights and foreign policy. Members of the
Agriculture, Trade, Defense, as well as Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations committees
regularly called on members of the Ukrainian National Association, Ukraine 2000 and
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other ethnic interest groups to give testimony about what was really happening in the
Soviet republic. In addition to giving testimony at hearings, Ukrainian-Americans were
full members of the Helsinki Commission. They joined their congressional colleagues on
the Commission as they "strengthened the spine of the State Department" at Helsinki
meetings.
As the previous chapter described, the one cause which solidified the lobby-
Congress partnership was the Stepan Khmara case. One hundred sixty five members of
Congress sent letters to President Gorbachev demanding Khmara 's release. This "dress
rehearsal" put in place the mechanism which would achieve for DeConcini what failed for
Senator Jesse Helms who attempted to pass similar legislation concerning Baltic
recognition. First, it exercised the internal communications of the lobby. While
DeConcini's reputation was essential in motivating po/Zcy-oriented senators, lobbying was
essential in motivating parochially-oriented members. The combination will be addressed
in the next section. Second, the Khmara case helped interested members and the lobby
identify the motivations of each member they would enlist for the recognition legislation.
Third, it raised the general awareness in Congress of the duality of American Soviet
foreign policy. In addition to these, the success of Senate Concurrent Resolution 65 lay,
ironically, in the "Chicken Kiev" speech itself. The speech put Ukrainian independence
on the political map, during and election year. This aspect, in combination with the
overall executive-legislative relationship, would prove essential to swaying members with
less than altruistic interest in supporting the legislation.
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B. THE REASONS WHY CONGRESS GOT INVOLVED
Political science literature underestimated the success of the ethnic lobby. One
reason is the literature's focus on the lobby-executive relationship. Before the post-
Vietnam Congress became increasingly involved in foreign policy, this was an appropriate
focus. The changing nature of Congress made it more permeable to the ethnic lobby.
Post-Vietnam changes included decentralization, the increasing role of staff, skepticism
toward the executive, creation of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the rise of
Caucuses and increase of travel opportunities for members. This more active Congress
coupled with the lobby's shift to a human rights emphasis in the 1980's required a new
analysis.
Therefore, what will be analyzed here are two primary reasons critics predicted the
failure of Congress and the lobby in Soviet policy. The first has to do with the nature of
the lobby itself. Nine reasons will be examined. The second has to do with what
motivates members to respond to a lobby once it has overcome those nine reasons for
failure.
C. NINE GOOD REASONS WHY THE LOBBY SHOULD HAVE FAILED
There are at least nine reasons most critics give for the past "failure" of the lobby.
But, what seemed "failure" (the equating Captive Nations to National Hot Dog Week),
really proved to be "foundation." Even if congressmen stuttered through the difficult
pronunciations of the various countries year after year, their statements at least kept
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Congress aware that there was a separate country of Ukraine. 27 [Ref. 58] When the
time came in 1991, this awareness would prove essential to American recognition. The
following are the nine most common criticisms of the lobby. By examining each one, it
is the aim of this chapter to show the changes in the lobby during the 1980's which led
to their success.
1. Assimilation.
Ethnics, especially over generations, eventually lose touch with the reality of
their homeland. Their attention turns from political to domestic concerns such as
business. For this reason, younger generations left or never joined the "nationalistic"
political organizations of their parents, and forged business and professional communities.
Some dropped out of organized ethnic communities all together.
What critics do not show, however, is that each of these non-political
organizations continued to lobby Washington. And, although criticized by the more
traditional organizations, young ethnics decided to "hitch their star" to the human rights
issue, while maintaining a "liberation" focus.
2. Lack of Cohesion.
Stephen Garrett argues that the failure of the lobby has not been a technical
one. He finds that,
...the real story of the ethnic lobby's failure may lie not so much in mistakes
made in Washington as in the general environment in which the lobby's
activities have proceeded.... Simply put, if the circumstances are right in both
27Graham Fuller, of the RAND Corporation, compared this to the "average-person-on-
the-street's" awareness of Tibet. Such public awareness may prove useful if an
independent Tibet becomes feasible.
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areas, even the most clumsy lobbying effort in Washington is bound to have
an important effect; if they are not, even the most skilled approaches to
government will likely prove unavailing. [Ref. 9:p. 31]
He gives the singular success story as the American Jewish community. Their strength,
he finds, is in their cohesion and their support by the general, non-Jewish public. The
Eastern European ethnic lobby, he continues, has not been able to demonstrate the same
strength in either of the two environmental areas" described. [Ref. 9:p. 31] The unity
displayed in the Stepan Khmara case clearly disproves the first point. One Helsinki
Commission observer noted that the letter campaign mounted by the Ukrainian-American
community brought results that were "unmatched even by the Jewish lobby."
3. Lack of Sympathetic Public Opinion.
The second point regarding the lack of support by non-ethnic Americans has
merit. It could be successfully argued that the general public was, and still is, ignorant
of the history and aspirations of the non-Russian republics. However, an in-depth
understanding of the ethnic platform was not necessary to understand the duality of Bush
Soviet policy. The media condemnation of the "Bloody Sundays" in Vilnius and Riga and
of Bush's "Chicken Speech" helped to lift this third liability.
4. Negative Connotations of Lobbying.
One scholar discounts the role of interest groups on foreign policy because of
the negative image most congressmen and the general public have of lobbying. Ross
Perot's campaign and the current debate over lobbying reform reemphasize this criticism.
Congressmen resist blatant pressure and the appearance of succumbing to such pressure.
Therefore, lobbyists must be careful in their approach. [Ref. 59]
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However, the ethnic lobby's shift to a human rights focus in the 1980's seems
to have softened their approach, alleviating any negative connotations of dual allegiance.
Furthermore, as the next section on lobbying will show, groups which accurately reflect
voter attitudes are welcomed more often than eschewed.
5. Limited scope, Inter- and Intra-ethnic Rivalries.
Another boon of joining forces with Congress on human rights was that it
broadened the lobby's scope, uniting them with other ethnic and non-ethnic interest
groups. This eliminated countervailing lobbies. 28 There exists no Russian ethnic lobby
in the United States. Rather, the countervailing forces were found in the political
establishment and among the academic specialists.
6. Congress' Limited Role in Foreign Policy.
It is important to distinguish congressmen's long- and short-term policy
interests. While a later section will give a more comprehensive treatment of Congress'
motivation to either defer or to take part in policymaking, the human rights issue should
be distinguished as a long-term interest for at least some of its proponents. Non-
governmental organizations like the Helsinki Commission, and Caucuses like those on
Human Rights and the Baltics and Ukraine, provided platforms for sustained interest in
foreign policy issues.
28An example of this "uniting" of the ethnic interest is the Jewish lobby's supporting
the lobby's push for eased immigration standards of Soviet Jewry.
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7. Small Size and Electoral Insignificance.
Furthermore, the lobby overcame its small electoral base. It is estimated that
the Ukrainian-Americans number 740,000 and organized members of the community
(including members of churches) number 100,000. While their small size would seem
to accurately project minimal influence, the intensity of their feelings and their access to
decisionmakers may have been underestimated. Despite assimilation of younger
generations of Ukrainian-Americans, the political goal of independence remained a pan
of Ukrainian cultural identity. This sentiment increased after the formation of Rukh.
8. Limited Access to Decisionmakers.
Access to decisionmakers had also increased by the 1980's. By then, an
ambassador, NSC members, congressmen, an assistant attorney general, and many other
members of the government and bureaucracy traced their Ukrainian heritage, or had
spouses who did. The power of these personal contacts in "working Washington" was
unaddressed in the literature.
9. Congress' Disregard for Constituent Opinion.
It has been argued that representatives do not make "an effective attempt to
discover majority opinion in their constituencies," and that, on foreign policy issues, a
congressman votes "as he or she feels best or looks to the administration." [Ref. 59:p.
103] This conclusion will be debated in the section concerning congressional motivation
in foreign policy. It will be argued that the previous literature accurately reflected the
policy motive of Congress, but ignored the parochial benefits which these groups offered.
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Of all the arguments against the lobby's prospect for success, its electoral
insignificance and Congress' subsequent disregard for it are the most cogent. The
following sections will examine each in turn.
D. SIZE OF THE LOBBY AS A REASON FOR FAILURE
The East European ethnic lobby was projected to fail due to its small size. This
argument assumes that parochial motivation and number of votes are synonymous. In
fact, small groups wield other parochial incentives which will be addressed here.
1. Voter Support and a "Passionate" Cause.
Even the most successful lobbies do not win every battle.
As labor, business, and agriculture have found, to establish a credible record
it is sufficient to win some of the hard fights....And so it is with the pro-
Israel lobby: not powerful enough to dictate American foreign policy in the
Middle East [i.e., to avert American condemnation of Israel's 1956 attack on
Egypt], but influential enough to become an important factor in the decision-
making process. [Ref. 60: p. 61]
Congress cannot and does not respond to every interest group. But it does respond to
some of them.
What qualities make a lobby "most likely to succeed?" Lee Hamilton says they
have to have good internal communication, know who the decisionmakers are and have
access at the right time (when the decision is being made), have good sources of
information within the executive and legislative branches and be able to enlist the support
of sympathetic groups. [Ref. 60: p. 18]
Measuring the Ukrainian-American community by this standard, it has the
proper attributes. Although small, it has very strong internal communication. Its access
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to legislative and executive information and understanding of "how Washington works"
was also strong by the mid-1980's. Active enlistment of sympathetic groups such as the
Lithuanians, Latvians, Croatians, Poles and other groups was pro forma, since they
found themselves in the same camp protesting the Bush administration's policies. Non-
ethnic groups, especially human rights groups were cultivated during the 1980's as
well.
The small size of the lobby may not have been a liability either. Vin Weber
and Tom Downey offer these attributes for the successful lobby: The most powerful are
the most passionate and those which represent actual votes. [Ref. 61] "Passionate voters
don't forget to vote against you at election time. " The large, PAC-supported lobby is not
necessarily the most powerful. 29 Each can only give $5000 per candidate and usually
do not. According to these former congressmen, the individual constituent who writes,
calls or asks for an appointment has more influence than the PACs. Washington-based
lobbies are influential if they accurately reflect voter attitudes at home.
Interviews with congressional staff seem to bear this argument out. One
legislative correspondent gave this account:
The heavy volume requires a priority system. We receive 1600 letters per
week and answer every one. The handwritten and passionate letters receive
priority. The computer-generated letters carry a little less weight. If a
Professional labor and business lobbyists contacted agreed that the emotional
message can overcome even the most amateur, unrefined lobbying technique.
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letter is signed with the first name only or with a hand written P.S. it is also
given more attention. 30
When asked about the number of letters required before an issue was brought to the
senator's attention, most staffers agreed with a colleague who said:
We send memos to the senator all day, including the content of letters
regardless of the number devoted to one issue. Of course, if we receive a lot
on one issue, we bring it to his attention. [Ref. 62]
Regarding the effect of ethnic constituents in particular, he responded:
Very often, letters are solicited in church. This is effective for two reasons.
First, the number of people who write, and second, the emotional tone of
their letters. We can receive hundreds from one temple or church. For
example, we received 250 from Armenian-Americans this week. [Ref. 62]
When asked about the negative connotations of lobbyists, most staff agreed that lobbyists
who represent the voters at home are usually looked on favorably by the congressman as
providing a service. They feel that they are supposed to be keeping in touch anyway.
Ethnic appeal may have more influence in the House than in the Senate.
Because ethnic groups tend to be concentrated in particular districts, they usually
represent a larger percentage of a constituency for House members than for Senators.
The chances that a countervailing ethnic group may be located in the same state
diminishes the ethnic appeal in the Senate. The more frequent election cycle in the House
reinforces this consideration.
30This was the favorite technique of one lobbyist interviewed. He believed the staffer
would assume he knew and might encounter the congressman in town, and would
therefore show the letter in its entirety.
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2. Lobby's Reflection of Attitudes at Home.
If a congressman finds that a Washington-based lobby does not accurately
represent voter attitudes at home, that lobby will quickly lose credibility. The lobby must
mobilize the larger community and sympathetic communities, if possible. However, not
all issues from the "homeland" unify an entire ethnic community into an effective lobby.
While the overthrow of the democratic regime in Athens did not mobilize the majority of
Greek-Americans, Turkish military operations in Cyprus and the subsequent displacement
of thousands of Greeks did. [Ref. 60: p. 62] A similar pattern is found in Ukrainian-
Americans. While the majority remained dormant during the human rights phase, they
were quickly unified against administration policy by the democratic movement in 1989.
3. Access to Facts.
While voter support may overcome the lack of money, the most important
source of any lobbyists power is facts.
Forty-three percent of House members have served less than five years.
Newspapers cannot give them the substantive detail they need. Congressional
staffs are over-worked and underpaid. Lobbyists help fill the information
vacuum. [Ref. 63]
The information received from Ukrainian-Americans about the events taking
place in the Soviet Union exceeded that from official sources. There are several reasons
for this. First, the State Department and CIA were Moscow-based, and maintained only
"outposts" in Kyiv, the Baltics and other non-Russian republics. One member of a
Washington-based human rights organization stated that Director Gates used the
Commission's intelligence instead of his own sources. [Ref. 64] Second, the mainstram
academic community was ignorant on Ukrainian issues. They did not know the language,
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history or the issues. They had marginalized those in their specialty of sovietology who
did. Third, the language skills which the community maintained and the travel
opportunities provided by glasnost and perestroika gave Ukrainian-Americans renewed
access to Ukraine. Fourth, because they had worked closely with the Helsinki Union in
Ukraine on human rights issues and the millennial celebration, Ukrainian-Americans had
strong communication links by the time the independence movement reached its peak. 31
Fifth, the political prisoners of the 1970's and early 1980's, for whom many congressman
had written letters of petition, became the leaders of the independence movement in 1989.
When Drach, Horyn, Chornovil and others arrived in Washington to join lobbying effort,
congressmen were eager to meet the men behind the names.
Even a well-organized, passionate lobby with access to decisionmakers and
all the right facts is only successful if a congressman uses its information in his or her
legislative decisionmaking. It is infeasible to question every congressman on the degree
to which she does this. It is even less likely that each would admit such parochial
motivation. Therefore, the next section will try to establish the likelihood that the ethnic
appeal is considered.
E. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION
Even if a lobby convinces a congressmen of the "right thing to do "-either morally
or politically—a representative must be motivated to do it. This section examines the
31One Washington-based office "E-mailed" Rukh thrice daily, sending White house
press releases and Congressional proceedings, while receiving updates on democratic and
communist movements in Ukraine.
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reason why a member of congress might be inclined to support Ukrainian independence,
against official U.S. policy.
Since Watergate and Vietnam, the Congress has played a more active role in foreign
policy [Refs. 65,66]. In addition to the structural reasons discussed above-decentraliza-
tion and subsequent increased permeability to public opinion-there is an increasing belief
that "members address policy issues because they believe doing so is part of their job."
[Ref. 67:p. 10]
Using James Lindsay's three hypotheses of congressional motivation, deference,
parochial and policy this section will test those hypotheses on the Congressional and
individual levels.
1. Deference.
Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy... the President has to be
the architect. [Ref. 68:p. 138]
The executive-legislative relationship is important in understanding the reasons
why Congress might be motivated to defer to the administration or respond to ethnic
group pressure. If there exist policy differences, significant public opinion or interest
group pressure, the relationship may change. [Ref. 69] In 1991 the executive-legislative
relationship was generally confrontational on a domestic level, and in foreign policy, it
was shifting from cooperation (i.e. in the Gulf War) and compromise to confrontation.
[Ref. 69]
However, to members of Congress, the issue of Ukrainian independence was
unlike the Gulf War and other foreign policy matters due to its roots in human rights.
Whereas many argue that the executive takes the lead in foreign policy formulation, while
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the Congress is relegated to micromanaging it once formed, Congress has tended to take
the lead in human rights issues. This has been true since the signing of the Helsinki Final
Act in 1975, and the forming of the Fascell or Helsinki Commission in 1976. The
Jackson-Vanik amendment is an example of Congress initiative in checking State
policy. 32
In addition to the already confrontational nature of the independence issue,
Congress as a whole, and therefore its members, had much to gain from opposing Bush
Soviet policy. First, was Bush's vulnerability to partisan politics in an election year.
Second, because of the House Post Office scandal, the Clarence Thomas hearings and
other problems, the Congress was the least loved-institution in several 1991 public opinion
polls. A wounded Congress needed some public victories. Third, public awareness of
Gorbachev's Baltic crackdown made opposition to Bush's Gorbachev-centered policy a
potential boon. An example of this is the then-Governor Clinton, advised by Ukrainian-
American Democrats, attacking Bush for "Chicken Kiev" in the Northeast and
MidWest. 33 Thus, any motivation to defer to the President may have been outweighed
by the political gains in opposing him. On a congressional level, then, the parochial
motive cannot be ruled out.
32The Jackson-Vanik amendment linked American trade with the Soviets to
immigration policies of Soviet Jewry.
"One Clinton campaign leaflet asked, "Did George Bush want to crush communism-
or just Ukraine?" and listed human rights cases ignored, Rukh members not visited on his
Kiev trip, and the "Chicken Kiev" speech in particular. See Appendix C.
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2. Parochial and Policy Motivation.
Nor can parochial motivation be ruled out on the individual level. While
"safe" seats may have the luxury of voting their consciences, "marginal" seats, especially
in an election year, do not. The parochial model argues that congress avoids the
substance of policy, and votes on what electoral benefits it can receive. The policy model
argues that congressmen really do care about the issues and want to shape the common
good. In the case of supporting Ukrainian independence, both were evident.
a. Policy Model
Men and women want to count for something....The need for meaning prods
legislators to be something more than freeloading hypocrites. [Ref. 66:p. 16]
It is not the intent of this paper to argue that representatives did not
support freedom in the Baltics and Ukraine because they thought it the "right thing to do.
"
Even so, it is erroneous to assume that all policy motivation stems from a sense of duty,
regardless of constituency interest. In fact, it appears that a combination of duty and
parochial impetus is the norm. In other words, "pork and policy are not mutually exclu-
sive." [Ref. 67:p. 31]
While all representatives contacted named "doing the right thing" as
their primary motivation in sponsoring or co-sponsoring Senate Concurrent Resolution 65,
ethnic lobbyists said they tailored their approach to each representative depending upon
perceived motivation. Some, the lobbyists said, backed their interests without pressure,
while less sympathetic members required more pressure. Compounding the problem is the
"chicken and egg" syndrome of representative interests. One foreign policy legislative
assistant described his boss' motivation this way:
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When he was a freshman, he joined the Caucuses and Committees because of
constituency interests. Now that he has learned more about the issues, he'd
vote for the legislation even if he weren't lobbied. [Ref. 62]
However, even senior members with genuine policy concerns may also have combined
motivations. Every ethnic lobbyist interviewed mentioned Senator DeConcini at the top
of the list of their supporters, yet his home state of Arizona comprises only 4.37 percent
East European ethnics. On the other hand, Senator D'Amato of New York also made the
top of the list, but his state comprises 14.35 percent East European ethnics. Both share
experiences on the Helsinki Commission, giving them insight into the democratic
struggles and human rights cases of the Soviet Union, and both are senior senators with
"safe" seats. Here, it may be impossible to distinguish duty from parochialism, but
neither have to be ruled-out.
3. Parochial Model.
Nothing is more important in Capitol Hill politics than the shared conviction
that election returns have proven a point. [Ref. 34:p. 37]
As described above, many compared Thornburgh's loss to Wofford (the
Republican loss of the 18.31 percent East European ethnic constituency in Pennsylvania)
to President Ford's losing the large Polish-American vote in 1976. The spin conveyed
to Congress by the ethnic lobby for the Republican defeat was foreign policy protest.
Thus, it could be argued that even a member with no substantive knowledge
of the independence issue could be motivated parochially by the election results.
The size of the East European ethnic vote exceeds ten percent in only 12
states. So, if the lobby were to rely solely on the voter incentive, it would fail to win the
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seats necessary to pass the resolution. They did achieve a winning coalition, however,
and the reason is that the issue invited a combination of incentives.
To show this, it is instructive to establish evidence of a relationship between
constituency size and attitude and a congressman's voting behavior. If James Lindsay's
argument that each incentive-parochialism, ambition or duty— "acknowledges that
members of Congress first and foremost want to be reelected" [Ref. 66:p. 7], then,
supporting independence must have had some electoral benefit. According to David
Mayhew, if the benefit is not in an ethnic constituency, then it may be in advertising,
credit claiming or position taking on a salient issue. [Ref. 34: p. 32] When Rukh
members visited Capitol Hill, some members asked them pointed, probing questions,
while others just wanted their pictures taken to send home to their constituencies. One
New York magazine carried a cover shot of Senator D'Amato, in fighting stance, with
the caption (referring to Gorbachev) "I'll Kick Him in the Baltics! " [Ref. 70] Regardless
of constituency's or the representative's level of understanding of the issue, the
advertising, credit claiming and position taking benefits were evident.
To reinforce the argument that the lobby's impact was greater than their
voting numbers would indicate, a look at the list of resolution sponsors is in order (see
Appendix F). Only 15 of the 24 senators from these states supported the
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legislation.
34 The remaining nine, while lobbied, were not positively influenced by the
group. The possible reasons why, while too numerous to mention in detail, may be the
perceived lack of parochial benefits or a disagreement of policy.
The House is harder to assess. Fifty-six of the sponsors had an ethnic
constituency, while the remaining 26 did not. This ratio is higher than in the Senate,
where the split between those with and without constituencies was 14 to 13. As
mentioned previously, the reason for the higher ratio may be that ethnic populations are
usually concentrated in certain districts.
To summarize, the relationship of constituency-to-vote is closer in the House
than in the Senate, where policy motivation seems to be greater. "Safe" seats in the
Senate tended to vote for or against the measure regardless of constituency size. It
appears that the requirement of a large voting population, for either house, was not
required. It is apparent that the small size of the Ukrainian-American population did not
hurt it on the floor.
Thus, supporting Ukrainian independence against the administration provided
congressmen the opportunity to do the right thing and receive electoral benefits as well.
A lobby which brought the issue back to the larger public made these policy benefits
possible.
34A large constituency is defined here as ten percent or greater. The breakdown of
percentage East European Ethnic to number of senators supporting the resolution is:
Connecticut, 18.42/2; Delaware, 10.02/0; Illinois, 15.46/1; Massachusetts, 11.63/1;
Michigan, 15.27/2; Minnesota, 10.93/0; Nebraska, 12.34/0; New Jersey, 17.7/2; New
York, 14.35/2; Ohio, 12.56/2; Pennsylvania, 18.31/2; Wisconsin, 16.43/1.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
That such a small ethnic group could reverse American foreign policy is
extraordinary. Their success relied upon two things. First, they possessed superior
insight to the experts in the intelligence, foreign policy and academic fields on the Soviet
reality. Second, their perceived power was much greater than their actual numbers. This
was augmented by their strategic location in important electoral districts and their being
lumped together with the Eastern European ethnics. Furthermore, history was on their
side: the dualistic policies of American Presidents toward the "captive nations" finally
caught up with the Republicans in a crucial election year.
The post-Cold War World in which multi-ethnic states collapse and nations rise
is troubling to foreign policymakers. As the Clinton administration seeks to redefine the
national interest, the role of the ethnic lobby may increase.
Before he left office, President Bush met with Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister,
Boris Tarasyuk. Bush told him that he believed the U.S. needed to cultivate close,
bilateral relations with Ukraine. He stated that he would advise the incoming President
Clinton of this. [Ref. 71] Unfortunately, the Clinton administration, despite campaign
rhetoric, has backslided.
Today, the Ukraine vs. Moscow and Gorbachev dilemma has been replaced by
Ukraine vs. Russia. This is manifested in the current U.S. policy of exhorting Kyiv to
relinquish its nuclear weapons to its primary security threat-Russia-without making any
78
security guarantees in return. The policy ignores what may happen when Ukraine is
disarmed and taken over by Russia: war and a reconstituted empire.
Ukraine is the only obstacle to a reconstituted empire. A U.S. policy of dealing
with Moscow and Kyiv on equal terms is the surest way to serve American security
interests in the region, which seem to be a democratic Russia, a democratic Ukraine and




This leaflet was distributed to ethnic voters in the Midwest by the Clinton Campaign.
It is representative of the way the Democrats used President Bush's policy toward Ukraine






George Bush is no friend of Ukraine.
He did nothing when the United States shipped a defecting Ukrainian
sailor into the hands of die KGB.
He sided with the communists in Moscow
when RUKH marched for freedom in Ukraine.
And one year ago, he went to Kiev and slapped Ukrainian democrats in
the face. He called Ukraine's hope for freedom "suicidal nationalism"
and told the Ukrainian people to bow to Moscow's will.
Bush's economic policy is costing Americans their jobs.
His foreign policy is drying up investment
and costing Ukraine its future.
Ukrainian-Americans have had enough
of George Bush's Chicken Kiev.
We need a change.
Pari for by. 55r@
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APPENDIX B
1980 AND 1990 CENSUS DATA ON UKRAINIAN-AMERICANS
Appendix A shows 1980 and 1990 census data on Ukrainian-Americans by slate. It




1980Ceas» l9*Cauma % laerease
(Decrease)
UNITED STATES 730,056 740,303 L5
Alabama 1218 U85 30.1
Alaska 446 962 1157
Arizona 5,447 8,471 55.5
Arkansas 570 870 526
California 49.724 56211 13.0
Colorado 5,065 6584 373
Connecticut 25,229 23.711 (6.0)
Delaware 4,394 4,950 12.7
District of Columbia L108 1.082 (23)
Florida 25,227 33,792 34.0
Georgia 2,680 4367 853
Hawaii 926 1234 333
Idaho 641 906 4L3
Qlioois 40387 38,414 (63)
Indiana 6,779 6379 (53)
Iowa 1,155 1356 17.4
Kansas 1,651 2075 25.9
Kentucky 1,410 1.582 122
Louisiana 1,616 1391 (13.9)
Maine 921 1328 442
Maryland 13,975 15.872 13.6
Massachusetts n,ia2 17,500 23
Michigan 47,189 43,914 (63)
Minnesota 9,522 10.691 123
Mississippi 643 480 (253)
Missouri 4,649 4,766 23
Montana L453 1,478 L7
Nebraska U23 1,161 (122)
Nevada U889 2,434 28.9
New Hampshire 2,078 2,434 17.1
New Jersey 80,751 73,935 (8.4)
New Mexico 1035 1412 46.1
New York 127.678 121.113 (5.1)
North Camima 2,766 4,897 77JO
North Dakota 3,212 3,634 13.1
Ohio 45.820 43.S69 (43)
Oklahoma 1,497 1,969 31.5
Oregon 4,092 6JZ20 520
Pennsylvania 143J862 129,753 (9.8)
Rhode bland 3^85 3330 (1-5)







Teas %,636 13,094 5L6
Utah 762 1,062 39.4
Vermont 848 978 15.3
Virginia 84)48 12321 53.1
nra&hmgtosi 7.885 10.814 37.1
West Virginia 1370 U14 (23.1)
WrsmiTjin 6J85 6,783 3i)
Wyoming 326 405 242
COMPIUD BY THE WASHINGTON OPVtCE OF THB UEBAlNlAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC
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APPENDIX C
PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARKS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UKRAINE IN KIEV, SOVIET UNION
This speech, dubbed "Chicken Kiev" in the American Press, was delivered on August
1, 1991.
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Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the
Republic of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet
Union
August I, J991
Well, first, thank all of you for that warm
welcome. And may I take this opportunity
to thank all people of Ukraine that gave us
such a warm welcome, such a heartfelt
greeting. Every American in that long mo-
torcade—and believe me, it was long—was
moved and touched by the warmth of the
welcome of Ukraine. We'll never forget it
Chairman Kravchuk, thank you, sir. And
to the Deputies of the Soviet, Supreme
Soviet, may I salute you. Members of the
clergy that are here, members of the diplo-
matic corps, representatives of American
pharmaceutical and health care corpora-
tions who I understand are with us today,
and distinguished guests alL Barbara and I
are delighted to be here—very, very happy.
We have only one regret, and that is that
Tve got to get home on Thursday night—
I
can still make it And the reason is, our
Congress goes out tomorrow,, finishes their
session they're in now, and I felt it was
important to be there on fhat- last day of
the final session.
This beautiful city brings to mind the
words of the poet Alexander Dovzbenko:
"The city of Kiev is an orchard. Kiev is a
poet. Kiev is an epic. Kiev is history. Kiev is
art."
Centuries ago, your forebears named this
country Ukraine, or "frontier," because
your steppes link Europe and Asia. But
Ukrainians have become frontiersmen of
another sort. Today you explore the fron-
tiers and contours of liberty.
Though my stay here is, as I said, far too
short, I have come here to talk with you
and to learn. For those who love freedom,
every experiment in building an open socie-
ty offers new lessons and insights. You face
an especially daunting task. For years,
people in this nation felt powerless, over-
shadowed by a vast government apparatus,
cramped by forces that attempted to con-
trol every aspect of their lives.
Today, your people probe the promise of
freedom. In cities and Republics, on farms,
in businesses, around university campuses,
you debate the fundamental questions of
liberty, self-rule, and free enterprise. Amer-
icans, you see, have a deep commitment to
these values. We follow your progress with
a sense of fascination, excitement, and
hope. This alone is historic. In the past, our
nations engaged in duels of eloquent bluff
and bravado. Now, the fireworks of super-
power confrontation are giving way to the
quieter and far more hopeful art of coop-
eration.
I come here to tell you: We support the
struggle in this great country for democracy
and economic reform. And I would like to
talk to you today about how the United
States views this complex and exciting
period in your history, how we intend to
relate to the Soviet central Government
and the Republican governments.
In Moscow, I outlined our approach: We
will support those in the center and the
Republics who pursue freedom, democracy,
and economic liberty. We will determine
our support not on the basis of personalities
but on the basis of principles. We cannot
tell you how to reform your society. We will
not tty to pick winners and losers in politi-
cal competitions between Republics or be-
tween Republics and the center. That is.
vour business; that's not the business of the
United States of America.
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Do not doubt our real commitment, how-
ever, to reform- But do not think we can
presume to solve your problems for you.
Theodore Roosevelt, one of our great Presi-
dents, once wrote: To be patronized is as
offensive as to be insulted. No one of us
cares permanentiy to have someone else
conscientiously striving to do him good;
what we want is to work with that someone
else for the good of both of us. That's what
our former President said. We will work for
the good of both of us, which means that
we will not meddle in your internal affairs.
Some people have urged the United
States to choose between supporting Presi-
dent Gorbachev and supporting independ-
ence-minded leaders throughout the
U.S.S.R. I consider this a false choice. In
fairness. President Gorbachev has achieved
astonishing things, and his policies of glas-
nost, perestroika, and democratization point
toward the goals of freedom, democracy,
and economic liberty.
We will maintain the strongest possible
relationship with the Soviet Government of
President Gorbachev. But we also appreci-
ate the new realities of life in the U.S.S.R.
And therefore, as a federation ourselves, we
want good relations—improved relations
—
with the Republics. So, let me build upon
my comments in Moscow by describing in
more detail what Americans mean when we
talk about freedom, democracy, and eco-
nomic liberty.
No terms have been abused more regu-
larly, nor more cynically than these.
Throughout this century despots have mas-
queraded as democrats, jailers have posed
as liberators. We can restore faith in gov-
ernment only by restoring meaning to these
concepts.
I don't want to sound like Tm lecturing,
but let's begin with the broad term "free-
dom.'* When Americans talk of freedom, we
refer to people's abilities to live without
fear of government intrusion, without fear
of harassment by their fellow citizens, with-
out restricting others' freedoms. We do not
consider freedom a privilege, to be doled
out only to those who hold proper political
views or belong to certain groups. We con-
sider it an inalienable individual right, be-
stowed upon ail men and women. Lord
Acton once observed: The most certain test
by which we judge whether a country is
really free is the amount of sec
by minorities.
Freedom requires toleranc
embedded in openness, in git
our first amendment proteci
freedoms of speech, associati
gion—all religions.
Tolerance nourishes hope. A
of glasnost-. Today, more tfc
words of Paul the Apostle,
years ago, ring out They coun
the dead, but look, we are aliv
in Russia, in Armenia, and th
spirit of liberty thrives.
But freedom cannot survive
pots flourish or permit seem in
strictions to multiply until the?
until they form shackles. Lai
visit the monument at Babi Y
reminder, a solemn reminder,
pens when people fail to hold
rible tide of intolerance and ty
Yet freedom is not the same
ence. Americans will not supp
seek independence in order
far-off tyranny with a local de
will not aid" those who prom
nationalism cased upon ethnic
We will support those who
democracy. By democracy,
system of government in whic
vie openly for the hearts
—
votes—of the public. We mea
government that derives its jui
the consent of the governed, t
legitimacy by controlling its
power. For years, you had e
ballots, but you did not enjo
And now, democracy has begi
roots in Soviet soiL
The key to its success lies u
ing government's proper role
Democracy is not a technical c
by dry statistics. It is the very
prise of preserving freedom, a
do the important things, the
tant things: raise families, exp
creativity, build good and fruit
In modern societies, freedor
racy rely on economic liberty,
my is nothing more than a sy
munication. It simply cannot I
out individual rights or a f
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which give people an incentive to go to
work, an incentive to produce.
And it certainly cannot function without
the rule of law, without fair and enforceable
contracts, without laws that protect proper-
ty rights and punish fraud.
Free economies depend upon the free-
dom of expression, the ability of people to
exchange ideas and test out new theories.
The Soviet Union weakened itself for years
by restricting the flow of information, by
outlawing devices crucial to modern com-
munications, such as computers and copy-




vented your own people from making the
most of their talent. You cannot innovate if
you cannot communicate.
And finally, a free economy demands en-
gagement in the economic mainstream.
Adam Smith noted two centuries ago, trade
enriches ail who engage in it Isolation and
protectionism doom its practitioners to deg-
radation and want.
I note this today because some Soviet
cities, regions, and even Republics have en-
gaged in ruinous trade wars. The Republics
of this nation have extensive bonds of trade,
which no one can repeal with the stroke of
a pen or the passage of a law. The vast
majority of trade conducted by Soviet com-
panies—imports and exports—involves, as
you know better than I. trade between Re-
publics. The oine-plus-one agreement holds
forth the hope that Republics will combine
greater autonomy with, greater voluntary
interaction
—
political, social, cultural, eco-
nomic—rather than pursuing: the hopeless
course of isolation.
And so. American investors and business-
men, look forward to doing business, in. the
Soviet Union, including the Ukraine- We've
signed agreements this week rhar will en-
courage further interaction between the
U.S. and all levels of the Soviet Union. But
ultimately, our trade relations will depend
upon our ability to develop a. common lan-
guage, a. common language of commerce-
currencies, that communicate with, one an-
other, laws that protect innovators, and en-
trepreneurs, bonds of understanding and
trust-
It should be obvious that the ties between
our nations grow stronger every single day.
I set forth a Presidential initiative that is
providing badly needed medical aid to the
Soviet Union. And this aid expresses .Ameri-
cans' solidarity with the Soviet peoples
during a time of hardship and suffering.
And it has supplied facilities in Kiev that
are treating victims of Chernobyl. You
shouid know that America's heart—the
hearts of all—went out to the people here
at the time of Chernobyl.
We have sent teams to help you improve
upon the safety of Ukrainian nuclear plants
and coal mines. We've also increased the
number of cultural exchanges with the Re-
publics, including more extensive legal, aca-
demic, and cultural exchanges between
America and Ukraine.
We understand that you cannot reform
your system overnight. America's first
system of government—the Continental
Congress—failed because the States were
too suspicious of one another and the cen-
tral government too weak to protect com-
merce and individual rights. In 200 years,
we have learned that freedom, democracy,
and economic liberty are more than terms
of inspiration. They're more than words.
They are challenges.
Your great poet Shevchenko noted; Only
in your own house can you have your truth.
your strength, and freedom. No society ever
achieves perfect democracy. Liberty, or en-
terprise; if it makes full use of its people's
virtues and abilities, it can use these goals as
guides to a better Life.
And now, as Soviet citizens try to forge a
new social compact, you have the obligation
to restore power to citizens demoralized by
decades of totalitarian rule- You have to
give rhA*n hope, inspiration, determina-
tion—by showing your faith in their abili-
ties- Societies that don't trust themselves or
their people cannot provide freedom- They
n*rt guarantee only the bleak tyranny of sus-
picion, avarice, and poverty.
An old Ukrainian proverb saysi When; you
«»nf*»r a great enterprise, free your soui
from, weakness. The peoples of the U-S^JL
have entered, a. great enterprise, full of
courage and vigor. I have come here today
to say: We support those who explore the
frontiers of freedom. We will join these re-
formers on the path to what we call—ap-
propriately call a aew world order.
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You're the leaders. You are the partici-
pants in the political process. And I go
home to an active political process. So, if
you saw me waving like mad from my lim-
ousine, it was in the thought that maybe
some of those people along the line were
people from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh or
Detroit where so many Ukrainian-Ameri-
cans live, where so many Ukrainian-Ameri-
cans are with me in the remarks I've made
here today.
This has been a great experience for Bar-
bara and me to be here. We salute you. We
salute the changes that we see. I remember
the French expression, oive la difference,
and I see different chumings around this
Chamber, and that is exactly the way it
ought to be. One guy wants this and an-
other one that That's the way the process
works when you're open and free—compet-
ing with ideas to see who is going to
emerge correct and who can do the most
for the people in Ukraine.
And so, for us this has been a wonderful
trip, albeit Far too short. And may I simply
say, may God bless the people of Ukraine.
Thank you very, very much.
Note: The President spoke at 3:55 p.m. in
Session Hall of the Supreme Soviet Build-
ing. Tn his remarks, he referred to Leonid
M. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Republic of
the Ukraine s Supreme Soviet.
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APPENDIX D
U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION
This table gives 1980 and 1990 census data on Eastern European ethnic groups. It
indicates percent change in each population.
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VS. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION
ETHNIC GROUP 1980 1990 CHANGE PERCENT
Albanian 38.658 47,710 9.052 23.42%
Armenian 212,621 308.096 95,475 44.90%
Belorassian 7381 n/r -7381 n/a
Bulgarian 42304 29.595
-1Z909 -3037%
Croatian 252,970 544.270 291300 115.15%
Czech 1,892,456 U00.192 -592,264 -3130%
Chechoslovakian n/r 315,285 315,285 n/a
East European 62,404 n/r -62,404 n/a
Estonian 25.994 26,762 768 2.95%
German Russian n/r 10,153 10,153 n/a
Hungarian 1,776,902 L582302 -194,600 10.95%
Latvian 92,141 100331 8,190 &89%
Lithuanian 742,776 811,865 69,089 930%
Macedonian n/r 20365 20365 n/a
Polish 8228,037 9366,106 1,138,069 13.8%
Rom n/r 5,693 5,693 n/a
Romanian 315,258 365344 50,286 15.95%
Russian 2,781,432 2^52^87 171355 6.17%
Ruihenian* 8,485 7,602 -883 -10.41%
Serbian 100,941 116,795 15,854 15.71%
Slavic 172,696 76,931 -95,765 -55.45%
Slovak 776,806 1^82,897 1,106,091 14239%
J
Slovene 126,463 124,437 -2,026 -1.60%
Soviet Union n/r 7,729 7,729 n/a
Ukrainian 730,056 740^03 10,747 1.47%
Yugoslavian 360,174 257,994 -102,180 -2837%
Others 77,762 259,585 181.823 233.82%
TOTAL 18.824,917 21,262,029 2,437.112 1295% |
n/r - Nor reported in chat
a/a - Not applicable
* Lined as Carpathian Ki ia 1990
COMPILED BY THE WASHINGTON OFFICES OF THE UKRAINIAN NATTONAL ASSOCIATION. INC
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APPENDIX E
U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION
This table lists East European ethnic groups by state, indicating population as
percentage of the total state population. States in which the East European ethnic group
is greater than ten percent are highlighted.
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EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION
I STATE ETHNICS or% STATE ETHNICS % j
United States 21,262,029 8.55% Missouri 228^15 4.46% I
Alabama 53,940 133% Montana 52,251 634%
j
Alaska 33344 6.06% Nebraska 194,773 1234%
Arizona 160376 437% Nevada 84,402 7.02%
Arkansas 39,906 L70% New Hampshire 87338 7.87%
California 1,931,758 6.49% New Jersey 1368364 17.70%
Colorado 236,190 7.17% New Mexico 52307 3.47%
Connecticut 605,527 18.42% New York 2382,440 1435%
Delaware 66,743 10.02% North Carolina 140,966 2.1396
D.C 35,691 5.88% North Dakota 63393 9.92%
Florida 1,040,481 8.04% Ohio 1362,059 1236%
Georgia 168,448 2.60% Oklahoma 76,609 244%
Hawaii 30,565 2.76% Oregon 153,808 5.41%
Idaho 33,884 337% Pennsylvania 2,175,477 1831%
Illinois 1,767,634 15.46% Rhode Island 84,944 8.47%
Tnrtinna 367,722 6.63% South Carolina 68,116 1.95%
Iowa 136,800 4.93% South Dakota 42,481 6.10%
Kansas 109,420 4.42% Tennessee 84,092 1.72%
Kentucky 56,729 1.54% Texas 644,826 3.80%







Massachusetts ©*,473 11.63% Washington 275,921 5.67%
Michigan 1*419,636 15L27% West Virginia 7U947 4.01%
Minnesota 478348 10tf3% Wisconsin 803,721 16.43%
Mississippi 29,298 1.14% Wyoming 25,764 5.68%
COMPILED BY THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC
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APPENDIX F
SPONSORS AND CO-SPONSORS OF
HOUSE AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS ON
UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE
This list shows the Senators and Representatives who sponsored (first two names
listed) and co-sponsored Sen. Con. Res. 65 and H. Con. Res. 212. The Senate resolution
was passed on November 20, 1991.
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SXONJLES. 65 CO-SPONSORS
DeCoaard. Denim Arizona lieberman, Joe OttttjCC \±£i rt
D'Amatn, AJfbnse M. New York Mack, Connie Florida
McCain, John Arizona
Adams, Brock Washington Metzeahanm, Howard M-Otno
Bradley, BiE New Jersey Mikuhki. Barbara A. Maryland
Dodd. Christopher J. Connecticut Moymhan, Daniel P. New York
Glenn, John Ohio Pressler, Larry Socnn Dakota
Graham. Bob Florida Riegle, Donald W. Michigan
Hatch, Orrin G. Utah Seymour. John California
Helms, Jesse North Camuna Shelby, Richard C Alabama
Incuye, Daniel K. Hawaii Simon, Paul Illinois
Kasien, Robert W. Wisconsin Specter, Aden Pennsylvania
Kerry, John F. Massachusetts Wallop, Malcolm Wyoming









































































































































































CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION
This resolution, signed into Public Law 86-90 on July 9, 1959, was written by the
Honorable Lev E. Dobriansky . It provided the foundation of the Captive Nations concept
upon which the Ukrainian-American lobby founded its cause.
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Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to
its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a har-
monious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the
most diverse of racial, religious and ethnic backgrounds; and
Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free
society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm
understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of people everywhere
and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations
of the world; and
Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by
Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexis-
tence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of
understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples;
and
Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian
communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses
a dire threat to security of the United States and of all the free peoples
of the world; and
Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through
direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national
independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia,
Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria,
mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania,
Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and
Whereas those submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel
of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and
independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian,
Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their
individual liberties; and
Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that the
desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these
conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and
Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming
majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful
deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace;
and
96
Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an
appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the
United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their
freedom and independence; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled. That the President of the United
States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the
third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the
people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate
ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and
requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as
freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive




The list of "captive," or "oppressed," nations dates back to 1920. As the list reveals,







































Source: Lev Dobriansky, "The Captive Nations Week Resolution Then and Now,"
Unpublished Paper of 1993.
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